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I. INTRODUCTION
Athletes are risk takers by nature and accept some risk of injury
merely by playing competitive sports. The possibility of bumps,
bruises and even broken bones during the course of play is a known
inherent risk willingly assumed by all athletes.1 Despite improved
athletics conditioning, equipment, and rules changes, deaths and seri-
ous head, neck, and spinal column injuries as well as thousands of
lesser injuries annually occur in amateur team sports.2
In addition to assuming normal inherent risks of injury, athletes
with a handicap or physical abnormality may expose themselves to in-
creased risk or severity of injury by participating in competitive
sports. Athletes physically capable of playing a sport despite a handi-
cap sometimes are willing to accept an enhanced risk of injury or po-
tential significant harm to themselves.
In many areas of sports medicine, there are no definite scientific or
universally agreed upon answers to the question of whether athletes
with a particular handicap or physical abnormality should participate
in certain competitive sports. Based on their individual experience
and professional judgment, competent physicians may reach different
conclusions regarding the nature and severity of the medical risks of
participation based on an athlete's unique physiological characteris-
tics. A team physician, expressing concern for an athlete's health, will
refuse to provide clearance to play if he or she deems the medical risks
of participation in a particular sport to be unreasonable. Other exam-
ining physicians or specialists may disagree with the team physician's
evaluation of the medical risks and clear the athlete to play, perhaps
with medication, periodic monitoring or protective equipment.
1. Gerald Secor Couzens, Footbal" A Painful Legacy for Players?, THE PHYSICIAN
& SPORTSMEDICINE, Oct. 1992, at 146; Gerald Todaro, Allocation of Risk Based on
the Mechanics of Injury in Sports: A Proposed Presumption of Non-Fault, 10
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 33, 41 n.37 (1987).
2. See generally NCAA, 1987 SPORTS MED. HANDBOOK at 22-23 (tables summarizing
fatalities and catastrophic injuries occurring in college sports); 1991 Am. Trauma
Soc. Sports Injury Fact Sheet; Marc Gunther, Little League Safety Record, Inju-
ries Decried on "20/20," DET. FREE PRESS, July 12,1991, at 6F, col. 1. For the first
time in sixty years, no player died from a football related injury in 1990. Score-
card, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 29, 1991, at 16. In 1991, Chucky Mullins, a Uni-
versity of Mississippi football player, died of a lung blood clot, a complication
resulting from paralysis suffered from making a tackle in a 1990 football game.
Chucky Mullins Dies From Lung Clot, Hous. CHRON., May 7, 1991, at 5B. James
Glenn, a Texas A&M placekicker, collapsed and died of a heart attack while loos-
ening up before a practice. Jonathan Feigen, A&M Kicker Dies, Hous. CHRON.,
Sept. 26, 1991, at IC.
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HeinOnline  -- 71 Neb. L. Rev. 988 1992
1992] ATHLETES WITH PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 989
Expressing concern for the student's well being and fear of tort
liability, a high school or university generally accepts the team physi-
cian's recommendation to disqualify a handicapped athlete from par-
ticipation in a school-sponsored athletics activity. Motivated by a
passion for sports and athletics success, an excluded handicapped stu-
dent nevertheless may desire to participate in interscholastic or inter-
collegiate athletics if physically able to do so. All parties must resolve
their conflicts considering the possible exposure of the handicapped
athlete to serious injury or death from athletics participation or un-
necessary exclusion of a gifted athlete from a chosen sport.
Many athletes have achieved notable athletics success without suf-
fering serious injury despite a handicap or disability. For example,
Pete Gray and Monty Stratton played professional baseball despite an
amputated limb.3 Despite their asthma, Jim Ryun achieved track and
field stardom, and Jimmy Connors is a championship tennis player.4
For the past several years, Terry Cummings has played professional
basketball with a heart condition controlled by medication.5 Kenny
Walker, who currently plays for the Denver Broncos, achieved All-
American status as a University of Nebraska football player despite
being deaf.6 Gail Devers won a gold medal in the women's 100 meter
dash in the 1992 Summer Olympics although she has Graves disease.7
On the other hand, several athletes have died or suffered serious
injury while playing with a physical abnormality. Hank Gathers re-
cently died of a heart attack while playing a college basketball game.
He suffered from a heart rhythm disorder.8 Several other well known
athletes with heart conditions have died during competitive sports
events or strenuous athletics activity.9 In addition, there are probably
some unreported instances in which athletes have suffered serious
3. HERB APPENZELLER, THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE 29 (1983).
4. Id- at 30. MacKenzie Phillips played football for the Arkansas Razorbacks in 1991
despite severe asthma requiring daily medication. Jonathan Feigen, Health Risk
Can't Keep Phillips From Football, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 31, 1991, at lB.
5. Gerald Eskenazi, Athlete and Health. Many at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990,
§ 8, at 1.
6. Bill Sullivan, Broncos' Walker Proves Skeptics Wrong Again, Hous. CHRON., Oct.
5, 1991, at 6B.
7. John H. Lee, Conquering Hero; Olympic Champion Gail Devers Makes Her Tri-
umphant Return to National City, L.A. TI Es, Oct. 20, 1992, at B3.
8. Shelley Smith, Death on the Court, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 12,1990, at 16. An
autopsy report listed Gathers' cause of death as idiopathic cardiomyopathy. News
Briefs, Tim PHYsIcIAN & SPoRTs iEDIcINE, Mar. 1991, at 41.
9. Pete Maravich, a former NBA star, Flo Hyman, an Olympic volleyball player, and
Chuck Hughes, a Detroit Lions' wide receiver, died from sudden cardiac death
while playing sports. Collen M. Fay, M.D. & Joseph S. Torg, M.D., Sudden Car-
diac Death in the Athlete: A Review, CONTEMP. ORTHOPAEDICS, June 1990, at 575.
See also Elliott Almond, Sudden Death For Athletes Is Not Uncommon, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 1990, at C13.
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athletics injuries directly attributable to a handicap or physical
impairment.
In light of the foregoing risks, the athletics participation decision
ideally should represent the mutual agreement of the team physician
and consulting specialists, school officials, and the handicapped athlete
and family (if he or she is a minor). In most instances, handicapped
athletes accept team physician recommendations not to participate in
a particular sport. Some handicapped athletes, however, have claimed
a legal right to participate in a given sport despite school officials' ad-
herence to the team physician's recommendation against playing.
Relying on conflicting medical testimony regarding the nature and
degree of enhanced risk created by a handicap, amateur athletes re-
cently have claimed a legal right to play contact sports or strenuous
non-contact sports with a single paired organ such as a kidney or eye,10
a spine abnormality,"1 or a heart condition.12 One high school athlete
even asserted a legal right to play high school football with a serious
heart condition despite unanimous recommendations of several physi-
cians against playing.1 3 Assuming the nature and extent of the ath-
lete's handicapping condition has been properly diagnosed and there
has been full disclosure of all material health risks of playing, who has
the ultimate legal authority to decide whether a handicapped amateur
athlete may participate in certain sports?14
This Article initially will note the lack of any definitive guidelines
or standards from college and high school athletics' governing bodies
regarding this issue. The conflicts among the handicapped athlete,
sports medicine physicians, and schools as well as the internal con-
flicts within each of these groups then will be addressed.
The handicapped athlete's right to participate in interscholastic
and intercollegiate athletics under the United States Constitution, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and state education laws will be analyzed.
10. See infra notes 203-219 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 113-123 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 190-199 and accompanying text.
14. This article will not extensively address whether handicapped or disabled profes-
sional athletes have a legal right to play competitive sports. The Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination against handicapped athletes, does not
cover professional sports teams unless they receive federal funds. 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 794(b)(West Supp. 1992). Professional teams and leagues are not subject to
claims based on the U.S. Constitution or 28 U.S.C. § 1983 unless their conduct
constitutes state action. Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459
(W.D.N.Y. 1977). Discrimination against handicapped professional athletes may
violate state human rights laws. Id The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
which is patterned after the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, appears to prohibit pro-
fessional teams from discriminating against athletes with disabilities that are not
"job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(4) and
(5)(A), 12112, 12113(a)(West 1992).
[Vol. 71:987
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Also addressed will be educational institutions' justifications for ex-
cluding handicapped athletes from certain athletics activities. The im-
plications of court-ordered participation of the handicapped in certain
athletics programs such as immunizing schools from tort liability and
coaches' duties to play handicapped athletes will be considered.
This Article will propose a legal standard to be applied on a case by
case basis in making the athletics participation decision when the con-
cerned parties disagree. This standard requires a delicate balancing of
a handicapped athlete's right to participate in athletics activities
within his or her physical capabilities, a physician's evaluation of the
medically significant risks of participation, and a school's interests in
establishing appropriate physical qualifications to ensure its athletes'
health and safety.
II. ATHLETICS GOVERNING BODIES' PERSPECTIVE
A. College and University
At the collegiate level, athletics governing bodies have not promul-
gated any definitive rules or regulations stipulating when a handi-
capped or physically impaired athlete may or may not participate in
competitive athletics. The National Collegiate Athletics Association
(NCAA), a private voluntary association of more than 1,000 member
colleges and universities, was originally formed to promote safety in
intercollegiate sports.15
The NCAA publishes a Sports Medicine Handbook containing the
organization's recommendations regarding various sports medicine is-
sues. 16 The Handbook recommends several sports medicine policies,
but NCAA members are not obligated to follow these guidelines, nor
are they subject to disciplinary sanctions for non-compliance. 17
Rather, each member school determines the minimum physical quali-
fications athletes must possess to participate in a particular sport.'8
The Handbook recommends a pre-participation medical exam
before the athlete engages in intercollegiate athletics and provides
that the exam should include a comprehensive health history, immu-
nization history and a physical examination, including an orthopedic
15. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport. Amateurism and
Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 7, 7-8 (1991).
16. These recommendations are formulated by a committee composed of athletics
administrators, coaches and experts in the field of physiology, medicine, athletics
training and law. NCAA, 1992-93 SPORTS MED. HANDBOOK at 2 [hereinafter
HANDBOOK].
17. Telephone Interview with Randy Dick, NCAA Division of Health Sciences (Jul.
26, 1991).
18. Id; Lawrence K. Altman, College Star's Death Puts Team Physicians Under New
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1990, at C3.
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evaluation.19 The Handbook recommends joint approval from the
physician most familiar with an impaired 20 athlete's condition, the
team physician, an appropriate school official, and parental consent if
the athlete is a minor before permitting an impaired athlete to partici-
pate in athletics.21 The Handbook further provides that "impaired"
athletes should be medically disqualified from participation only if the
impairment presents an "unusual risk of further impairment or disa-
bility to the individual and/or other participants." 22
The National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), a
private organization that regulates intercollegiate athletics between
approximately 500 member schools,23 has no written standards, guide-
lines or recommendations regarding the disqualification of handi-
capped athletes from competition.24 Like the NCAA, the NAIA
leaves handicapped athlete participation decisions to the discretion of
its member schools.25
B. High School
State high school athletics associations have varying physical ex-
amination requirements regarding participation in interscholastic ath-
letics.26 The vast majority of states authorize only physicians to
conduct the examination, but a few states allow nurses or physicians'
assistants to do so.27 Most states do not provide examiners with spe-
cific guidelines for conducting the examination or provide recommen-
dations for exclusion from athletics participation.2
Most high school athletics associations only require a physician's
19. NCAA Guideline 1B, HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 8.
20. The Handbook defines "impaired" as "any loss or abnormality of psychological,
physiological or anatomical structure or function." NCAA Guideline 3A, HAND-
BOOK, supra note 16, at 34.
21. Id. The Handbook provides that the "team physician has the final responsibility
to determine when a student-athlete is removed or withheld from participation
due to an injury or illness." NCAA Guideline 2A, HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at
14.
22. NCAA Guideline 3A, HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 34.
23. G. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW 3-4 (1986).
24. Telephone Interview with Wallace Schwartz, NAIA Vice President of Adminis-
tration (Jul. 29, 1991).
25. Id.
26. Ronald A. Feinstein et al., A National Survey of Preparticipation Physician Ex-
amination Requirements, THE PHYsICIAN & SPORTMEDICINE, May 1980, at 51.
Charles V. Russell, Legal and Ethical Conflicts Arising From the Team Physi-
cian's Dual Obligations to the Athlete and Management, 10 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J.
299, 313 (1987).
27. Feinstein et al., supra note 26, at 54.
28. Id. at 54-55. Three states provide examiners with the American Medical Associa-
tion's (AMA) Disqualifying Conditions for Sports Participation. Id. See infra
notes 50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the AMA's Disqualifying
Conditions.
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approval based on a discretionary examination before school-spon-
sored athletics participation. The completeness of an examination and
participation recommendation depends primarily on the sports
medicine knowledge, interest, and time commitment of the examining
physician.29 Thus, at both high school and university levels, there are
no bright line policies in the area of participation by impaired or hand-
icapped athletes.
III. ATHLETE'S PERSPECTIVE
Athletes are one of the most revered groups in American society
and are among its highest paid members. The strong public interest in
competitive athletics as well as fame and substantial economic award
bestowed upon top professional athletes has an alluring effect on
young amateur athletes.
Athletes are motivated by the pursuit of excellence and potential
economic gain. The star high school athlete seeks a college athletics
scholarship; the top flight college athlete desires a lucrative profes-
sional career. High school and college athletics careers generally are
limited to four years, respectively. To achieve desired athletics objec-
tives, the athlete must have the current ability to perform and be will-
ing to make the necessary sacrifices.
The public adulation of successful professional sports figures0 may
foster a willingness among young amateur athletes to take significant
health risks to play competitive sports.3 1 Even amateur athletes are
lionized for overcoming a serious injury, illness, or disability to suc-
ceed in sports.32 "Playing with pain" is perceived as a badge of honor
29. Feinstein et al., supra note 26, at 54-55.
30. See generally James H. Davis, "Fixing" the Standard of Care: Motivated Athletes
and Medical Malpractice, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 215, 220-21 (1988). The Hous-
ton Chronicle recently published a feature article on Houston Oilers lineman
Doug Dawson, who resumed playing professional football after a four-year ab-
sence because of a torn Achilles tendon. John McClain, Oilers'Dawson: A Suc-
cess Story, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 4, 1991, at B1.
31. '"oobie" Miles, a fullback for Permian High School in Odessa, Texas, tore liga-
ments and cartilage in his knee during a preseason scrimmage. An orthopedic
surgeon recommended that he have immediate reconstructive surgery. Instead,
Miles chose a rehabilitation program allowing him to play football with a knee
brace. He was willing to risk further injury to his knee and future arthritis to
pursue his dream of a professional career. H.G. Bissinger, Friday Night Lights,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 17, 1990, at 82.
32. For example, the NCAA awarded Kevin Singleton, a former University of Ari-
zona football player, the Division I-A Athletics Directors Association Award of
Courage. Singleton overcame acute leukemia to resume playing college football.
Joe Rhett also was nominated for the same award. He continued to play basket-
ball at the University of South Carolina after his irregular heartbeat was diag-
nosed and a pacemaker was installed. Courage Award Goes to Arizona's
Singleton, Tim NCAA NEws, Sept. 23, 1991, at 2. Chris Rogers, a linebacker at
Lock Haven University, was cleared to play football during the 1991 season while
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and courage.33
Economic pressure such as the loss of a potential scholarship or
professional career or the fear of losing a starting position provides
strong incentive to any star athlete to play with a handicap or impair-
ment. In addition, pressure from the athlete's fellow players and
coaches along with psychological factors such as machismo, pride, and
the joy of competitive sports participation may strongly influence an
amateur athlete to take health risks.3 4
A recent empirical study concluded that athletes suffering injuries
do not deny their pain, but suggests they would rather play with physi-
cal pain than suffer the emotional pain of not playing.35 Handicapped
athletes may risk future injury rather than experience emotional pain
from exclusion from a particular sport. Young athletes also tend to
believe they are immortal and do not always make thoughtful deci-
sions consistent with their long-term best health.36
The willingness of some high school and college athletes to risk
their lives to play competitive sports raises serious questions regarding
their capacity to make a responsible decision regarding playing with a
handicap or disability. Stephen Larkin's desire to play high school
football with a serious heart condition against unanimous physicians'
advice was so strong that he told his mother, "Mother, if I have to die,
battling Hodgkin's Disease. Patrick A. Doughia, Lock Haven Player Has Battles,
THE NCAA NEWS, Oct. 28, 1991, at 2.
33. G. Larry Sandefer, College Athletic Injuries: Does the Buoniconti Case Create a
Duty of an Athlete Not to Play?, 63 FLA. B.J. 34, 35-36 (1989).
34. See generally Cathy J. Jones, College Athletes: Illness or Injury and the Decision
to Return to Play, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 113, 150-57 (1992); Davis, supra note 30, at 216;
Joseph H. King, The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18 Hous.
L. REV. 657, 692-93, 703 (1981); Russell, supra note 26, at 318.
35. The results of the study by Aynsley M. Smith, a sports psychologist at the Mayo
Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, is discussed in James S. Thornton, Playing in
Pain: When Should an Athlete Stop?, THE PHysiciAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, Sept.
1990, at 138, 141.
36. Thornton, supra note 35, at 142; Thomas G. Allison, Counseling Athletes at Risk
For Sudden Death, THE PHYsIcIAN SpoRTsMEDIciNE, June 1992, at 140, 142, 145;
Athletes With Health Problems: Do They Play or Not?, THE NCAA NEvs, Aug. 1,
1990, at 1. For example, a Temple University football player, who was temporar-
ily paralyzed during a game, suddenly sprang up and desired to return to the
game while being transported to the hospital in an ambulance. Angelo Cataldi &
Glen Macnow, The Pitfalls of Playing With Pain, Athletes Must Carry Much of
the Blame, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 20, 1989, at DOI. Mark Tingstad, a col-
lege football player, initially chose to resume playing football with an abnormally
narrow spinal canal, thereby risking the possibility of permanent paralysis. See
infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. Tingstad explained, "When you're an
athlete and you're involved in sports with a physical activity, you think you're
impervious, you're talented and you think nothing can happen to you." He later
gave up college football after suffering temporary paralysis making a tackle. Ger-
ald Eskenazi, Athlete and Health: Many at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990, § 8, at
1.
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I'd rather die playing ball. That's what I love to do."37 Five years ago,
MacKenzie Phillips was resuscitated from clinical death after suffer-
ing cardiac arrest from exercise-induced asthma.38  Nevertheless,
Phillips played football for the University of Arkansas during the 1991
season even after doctors told him he would never live a normal life if
he continued to play with severe asthma.39
In some instances, an athlete's decision to play with a handicap,
even with physician approval, leads to tragedy. Hank Gathers40 and
Tony Penny4 l died of heart attacks during basketball games while
playing with known heart conditions. Although some amateur ath-
letes are willing to expose themselves to significant health risks by
playing, most athletes will act reasonably in response to a trusted phy-
sician's recommendation regarding athletics participation.42
IV. TEAM PHYSICIAN'S PERSPECTIVE
Most patients seek a cure for an injury, illness, or disease when
seeking medical treatment. Patients usually accept without question
physician recommendations against participation in certain activities
to protect their health and safety. Most patients' health interests are
consistent with their overall life interests. Moreover, some athletes,
motivated by concern for their health, voluntarily discontinue playing
a sport after recovery from a serious injury even if medically cleared
to play.43
On the other hand, for emotional and economic reasons, there may
be a divergence between a handicapped athlete's health interests and
athletics interests. A handicapped athlete may be willing to take sig-
37. Mike Dodd, Who Decides Health Risk is Too High?, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 5,1990, at
1C. See also infra notes 99-101 and 190-199 and accompanying text regarding Ste-
phen Larkin's lawsuit to continue playing high school football. To keep playing
high school baseball, Jeff Banister, now a catcher for the Pittsburgh Pirates, re-
fused his physician's recommendation that his cancerous leg be amputated. He
told his father, "I'd rather die than not be able to play baseball." Bucs Make
Dream Reality For UH Ex, Hous. POST, July 24, 1991, at C-7.
38. Jonathan Feigen, Health Risk Can't Keep Phillips From Football, Hous. CHRON.,
Aug. 31, 1991, at lB.
39. 1d.
40. See infra note 75 and accompanying text. A teammate of Hank Gathers stated,
"Everybody knew that Hank would rather die than not be able to play the way he
could play or not play at all. "We Weren't Told" Loyola, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7,
1990, at P1.
41. See infra notes 62-73 and accompanying text.
42. Dr. Barry Goldberg, director of sports medicine at Yale University Health Serv-
ices, states: "Athletes in general are very reasonable if you are, too .... You have
to win their trust that your decisions won't be arbitrary." Thornton, supra note
35, at 138.
43. Bryan Wilcox, a UCLA football player, decided not to play in an upcoming season
after suffering four or five concussions in recent years. Jerry Crowe, Wilcox
Won't Return to Bruins This Year, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1989, at C5.
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nificant health risks to participate in athletics and attempt to influ-
ence a physician's medical judgment to obtain approval to do so.
A team physician44 may face pressure from school athletics offi-
cials 45 or the handicapped athlete to provide medical clearance to play.
Some physicians will consider a handicapped athlete's playing skills
and economic interests, not merely the medical risks, in deciding
whether to clear an athlete to play. For many years, Dr. Richard Ke-
hoe has given professional basketball player Terry Cummings medica-
tion to enable him to play with an irregular heartbeat. 46 Dr. Kehoe
would not have prevented Hank Gathers from using his "one-in-a-mil-
lion" basketball talent unless "there was absolutely overwhelming
compelling evidence that you had to."47
A team physician's paramount responsibility is to protect the ath-
lete's health.48 Despite the pressures created by an obsession with
winning games and the objective of not unduly restricting athletics
participation, the team physician has "an even bigger obligation to
keep athletes alive and free from further injury."49
To assist physicians in making participation recommendations for
handicapped athletes, medical organizations have formulated some
guidelines. The American Medical Association's (AMA) Disqualifying
44. A "team physician" has been defined as "a physician who undertakes to render
professional medical services to athletics participants and whose services are
either arranged for or paid for at least in part by an institution or entity other
than the patient, the patient's family, or some surrogate." King, supra note 34, at
658.
45. In a recent court case, the Citadel's head trainer testified that the school's foot-
ball coaches, in pursuit of athletics success, occasionally attempted to override
medical staff decisions against participation by injured athletes. Angelo Cataldi
& Glen Macnow, Team Doctors: A Crisis In Ethics, Philadelphia Inquirer, June
18, 1989, at A01. See infra notes 76-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Marc Buoniconti's negligence suit against the Citadel's team physician for permit-
ting him to play football with a neck injury.
46. Malcolm Ritter, Gathers' Death Points Up Tough Medical Choices, Doctors Say,
AP, Mar. 6, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
47. Id. But see King, supra note 34, at 700 (arguing that sports physicians should not
"abdicate professional responsibilities to promote health by condoning the taking
of unnecessary risks").
48. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 3.06 (1990);
King, supra note 34, at 691.
49. Leland L. Fairbanks, Return to Sports Participation, THE PHYSICIAN & SPORT-
SMEDICINE, Aug. 1979, at 71. Dr. James A. Nicholas, founder of the Nicholas Insti-
tute for Sports Medicine and Athletic Trauma in New York City and orthopedist
for several New York professional teams, has stated:
There are times when you let players play with conditions that are
not life-threatening, but they can be hurt.... But when you get into life-
threatening situations-I don't think a person with arrhythmia [an irreg-
ular heartbeat] should be allowed to play. I don't believe you can justify
a potentially lethal injury.
Gerald Eskenazi, Athlete and Health. Many at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1990,
§ 8, at 1.
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Conditions for Sports Participation were intended to serve as guide-
lines rather than blanket disqualification standards for athletes with
certain diseases or medical conditions. 50 However, these guidelines,
last revised in 1976, have become increasingly obsolete and are no
longer distributed by the AMA.51
In 1988, the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Sports
Medicine compiled a revised list of recommendations for sports partic-
ipation by young athletes with certain medical conditions.52 The Com-
mittee's recommendations "do not indicate an exclusive course of
treatment or procedure to be followed."53 The Committee also con-
cluded that "[v]ariations, taking into account individual circumstances,
may be appropriate."5 4 "A physician's clinical judgment should re-
main the final arbiter in interpreting these recommendations for a
specific patient."5 5 The Committee concluded the physician and the
athlete and parents must jointly weigh whether the advantages of ath-
letics participation are worth the involved health risks.56
The American College of Cardiology's 1984 Bethesda Conference
formulated recommendations for sports participation by athletes with
cardiovascular abnormalities. 57 The Conference participants acknowl-
edged that "many decisions regarding disqualification from sports in-
50. G.C. Myers & James G. Garrick, M.D., The Preseason Examination of School and
College Athletes, in SPORTS MED. 247 (R. Strauss ed., 1984). Robert E. Shepherd,
Jr., Wvhy Can't Johnny Read or Play?, The Participation Rights of Handicapped
Student-Athletes, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 163, 165-68 (1991). A listing of these
disqualifying conditions is reprinted in this article. Id. at 165-68 n.10. See also
Douglas B. McKeag, Preparticipation Screening of the Potential Athlete, 1989 OF-
FICE PRACTICE OF SPORTS MED. 373 (proposing guidelines for clearance and dis-
qualification of athletes).
51. Shepherd, supra note 50, at 165-68 n.10-11. Many 1976 AMA disqualifying condi-
tions currently are considered overly restrictive. Paul G. Dyment, New Guide-
lines for Sports Participation, THE PHYsICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, May 1988, at
45.
52. Committee on Sports Medicine, Recommendations for Participation in Competi-
tive Sports, 81 PEDIATRIcS 737 (1988).
53. Id
54. Id.
55. Id. at 739. Regarding the American Academy of Pediatrics' participation guide-
lines, one pediatrician has commented:
Because of the variety of individual situations, problems will arise when
generalized recommendations are proposed. ... Deciding which preexist-
ing medical conditions should preclude athletes from participating in
sports depends mainly on an opinion that is based on both clinical expe-
rience and common sense. There is little scientific data to assist physi-
cians in questionable cases.
Dyment, supra note 51, at 45.
56. Committee on Sports Medicine, Recommendations for Participation in Competi-
tive Sports, 81 PEDATRICS 737, 737 (1988).
57. Barry J. Maron et al., Introduction, 16th Bethesda Conference: Cardiovascular
Abnormalities in the Athlete: Recommendations Regarding Eligibility For Com-
petition, 6 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1189, 1189 (1985).
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volve circumstances in which definite scientific answers are
conspicuously lacking."58 The Conference's recommendations thus
"are necessarily based largely on the practice of the 'art of
medicine.' 59
Recognizing that the athletics participation decision "involves com-
plex medical and legal principles," the Conference participants con-
cluded: "The physician's primary responsibility is to make
recommendations to the athletes, and that the physician need not be
solely responsible for the ultimate decision of whether an athlete is
permitted to compete."60
Although a handicapped athlete and family have significant input,
the team physician's participation recommendation may be determina-
tive. Schools generally follow the recommendations of the team phy-
sician and consulting specialists in deciding whether athletes should
be permitted to play a particular sport.61
Because of the lack of conclusive scientific data and a handicapped
athlete's unique physiology, the team physician, often with the assist-
ance of consulting specialists, must make an individualized evaluation
of the medical risks of participation in a given sport. As expected,
based upon the varying standards just noted, different physicians may
reach conflicting conclusions based on their examination of the
athlete.
If a physician recommends that a handicapped athlete not play, his
competence may be questioned in a lawsuit by the athlete. In 1986,
two cardiologists diagnosed Tony Penny, a Central Connecticut State
University basketball player, as having hypertrophic cardiomy-
opathy,62 the most common cause of sudden cardiac death in young
athletes. 63 These physicians recommended that Penny discontinue
playing competitive basketball.64 Based on these medical recommen-
dations, Central Connecticut refused to allow Penny to play on its bas-
ketball team for two seasons.65
Fearing the loss of a potentially lucrative professional basketball
58. Id. at 1190.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
62. Lawrence K. Altman, M.D., The Doctor's World; An Athlete's Health and a Doc-
tor's Warning, N.Y. TImEs, Mar. 13, 1990, at 3C [hereinafter Altman]. Hyper-
trophic cardiomyopathy is an abnormal thickening of the heart of unknown
cause. Id.
63. Fay & Torg, supra note 9, at 576. See generally Francis M. McCaffrey et al., Sud-
den Cardiac Death In Young Athletes, 145 AM. J. DISEASES CHILDREN 177
(1991)(providing recommendations for identifying asymptomatic young athletes
at risk for sudden cardiac death).
64. Altman, supra note 62.
65. Complaint at 2-3, Penny v. Sands, No. H89-280 (D. Conn., filed May 3, 1989)[here-
inafter Penny Complaint].
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career more than the risks of playing with a serious heart condition,
Penny was reluctant to accept those physicians' collective judgment.66
He ultimately obtained opinions from other cardiologists that his
heart condition should not prevent him from playing competitive
basketball.67
Claiming a right to participate in college athletics, Penny
threatened Central Connecticut with a lawsuit unless he was allowed
to play basketball his senior year. Those parties executed an October
21, 1988 agreement permitting Penny to resume playing intercollegi-
ate basketball.68
After completing his college basketball career, Penny filed a mal-
practice suit against Dr. Milton J. Sands, the cardiologist who initially
diagnosed his heart condition and advised against further participation
in competitive sports.69 Penny alleged his heart condition had been
misdiagnosed and that Dr. Sands negligently prevented him from
playing college basketball for two years.70 Penny claimed damages of
$1,000,000.71 Penny eventually dismissed his lawsuit against Dr.
Sands.72 Penny subsequently died of a heart attack in 1990 while play-
ing in a professional basketball game in Manchester, England.73
In contrast to the Penny lawsuit, some team physicians have been
sued for approving participation of athletes who subsequently suffer
death or serious injury during athletics competition.74 Hank Gathers'
heirs sued the physicians who provided heart medication and cleared
66. Altman, supra note 62. See also Maron, supra note 57 (observing that the deci-
sion to disqualify elite professional or intercollegiate athletes with cardiovascular
abnormalities may be complicated by the monetary value of athlete and extreme
emphasis on competitive achievement).
67. Altman, supra note 62.
68. October 21,1988 Release Agreement between Anthony Penny, Central Connecti-
cut State University, and Board of Trustees of Central Connecticut State Univer-
sity (on file with author)[hereinafter Release]. Central Connecticut agreed to
allow Penny to play basketball provided he reported for and submitted the re-
sults of specified physical exams and tests, and until two named physicians certi-
fied he was no longer physically able to participate in athletics at Central
Connecticut. Penny agreed to release all claims against Central Connecticut aris-
ing out of his participation in athletics due solely to his cardiovascular system. Id
69. Penny Complaint, supra note 65, at 4.
70. id.
71. Penny's claimed damages were based on: 1) lost enjoyment of life as a result of
the two-year restriction on playing college basketball; 2) lost future income from
professional basketball; 3) costs of obtaining additional medical opinions regard-
ing his heart condition; and 4) pain resulting from tests to diagnose his condition
and prescribed medication. Penny Complaint, supra note 65, at 5.
72. Altman, supra note 62.
73. I&
74. The topic raises issues such as the appropriate standards physicians should ad-
here to in clearing athletes to play. These important issues merit consideration
but are outside the scope of this article. See generally Morley Ben Pitt, Malprac-
tice on the Sidelines: Developing a Standard of Care for Team Sports Physicians,
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him to play college basketball.75
Marc Buoniconti, a former linebacker for The Citadel, lost a negli-
gence suit against the school's team physician. 76 Buoniconti was per-
manently paralyzed while making a tackle during an October 26, 1985
game with East Tennessee State University.77 Buoniconti asserted
that Dr. E. K. Wallace, Jr. wrongfully permitted him to play in the
game with ill-conceived equipment, a spine abnormality and a serious
neck injury.7 8
Team physicians often are faced with the conflicting obligations of
protecting the health of the handicapped athlete while attempting to
enable the athlete to participate safely in a desired sport. Although
some participation guidelines exist, the team physician ultimately
must rely on personal medical judgment based on the athlete's partic-
ular handicap and individual physical characteristics, as well as the
nature of the particular sport. The team physician must not allow
pressure from a handicapped athlete or third parties to override
independent medical judgment in making a participation
recommendation.
V. SCHOOL'S PERSPECTIVE
It is well established, and beyond the subject of this analysis, that
colleges and high schools must use reasonable care in operating their
2 COMM/ENT L.J. 579, 590 (1980); Davis, supra note 30; Russell, supra note 26;
King, supra note 34.
75. Gathers' death resulted in the filing of multimillion dollar lawsuits by his
mother, minor son and other heirs against Loyola Marymount and its coach and
athletics trainer as well as several physicians participating in Gathers' care and
treatment. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' physicians negligently diag-
nosed and treated Gathers. The lawsuits further contended that defendants con-
spired and fraudulently failed to inform Gathers of the seriousness of his heart
condition and the danger of continuing to play competitive basketball. Plaintiffs
further alleged that, at the urging of Loyola Marymount's coach, Gathers' heart
medication was reduced below therapeutic levels to enable him to play at a higher
level. In sum, plaintiffs contended that Gathers was "sacrificed on the altar of
basketball" in Loyola Marymount's quest for basketball success, notoriety and
economic gain. See generally Complaint, Gathers v. Loyola Marymount Univ.,
No. C759027 (Los Angeles, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 20, 1990); Shelley Smith, A
Bitter Legacy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 4, 1991, at 62; Marianne Lavelle, From
Court to Court, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1991, at 1; Frances Munning, The Death of
Hank Gathers. A Legacy of Confusion, THE PHYsiciAN & SPORTSMEDCiNE, May
1990, at 97. All of plaintiffs' claims ultimately were settled or dismissed prior to
trial. Gathers Family Suit Dismissed by Judge, Hous. CHRoN., Sept. 10, 1992, at
8C; Gathers' Mother Settles Lawsuit With University, THE NCAA NmWs, Apr. 1,
1992, at 2.
76. William Nack, Was Justice Paralyzed?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 25, 1988, at 32.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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athletics programs.79 Schools and athletics teams are required to fully
inform athletes of the foreseeable risks of participating in competitive
sports.8 0 Schools may be held liable for negligently permitting or per-
suading injured athletes to plays' or failing to inform a physically im-
paired athlete of the risks of continued sports participation.8 2 A
detailed discussion of potential liability for negligently failing to de-
tect physical abnormalities before permitting an athlete to participate
in athletics is outside the scope of this article.
For present purposes, it is assumed the existence of the athlete's
handicap or abnormality is known and the material risks of participa-
tion in the subject sport have been fully disclosed to the athlete and
family. The central issue addressed here is the school's right to pre-
vent a handicapped athlete from participating in a particular sport
under those circumstances.
Most colleges permit an athlete to play a sport only if the team
physician has given medical clearance.83 Schools fear possible tort lia-
bility for allowing an athlete to play contrary to the recommendation
of the team physician. Even if the athlete and family are willing to
waive all legal claims against the school for possible injury or death
from athletics participation, schools may prohibit participation out of
concern for the student's health and welfare.
Both colleges and high schools have asserted that the doctrine of
parens partriae justifies denial of athletics participation in accordance
79. The NCAA's 1992-93 Sports Medicine Handbook states: "Student-athletes right-
fully assume that those who are responsible for the conduct of sport have taken
reasonable precautions to minimize the risk of significant injury." HANDBOOK,
supra note 16, at 4. See generally JOHN C. WEISTART & CYm H. LOWELL, THE
LAW OF SPORTS § 8.05 (1979).
80. See, e.g, Lister v. Bill Kelly Athletic, Inc., 485 N.E.2d 483 (Il. App. Ct. 1985); Ven-
drell v. School Dist. No. 26C, Malheur County, 376 P.2d 406,413 (Or. 1962)(finding
no negligent instruction under the facts of case). See generally, Melonie L. Davis,
Sports Liability of Coaches and School Districts, 1989 F.I.C.C. Q. 307, 309-10.
81. Morris v. Union High School Dist. A, King County, 294 P. 998 (Wash. 1931).
82. Accord Krueger v. San Francisco Forty Niners, 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1987)(profes-
sional team and physician liable for fraudulent concealment of risks of continued
play with knee injury).
83. A 1984 survey of NCAA and NAIA schools revealed that team physicians at ap-
proximately 58% of the respondents made the final decision regarding when an
injured or ill athlete returns to intercollegiate football competition. G.D. Rovere,
M.D. et al., A Survey of Team Physician and Trainer Availability and Participa-
tion in Intercollegiate Football, THE PHYsIcIAN & SPORTSMEDiciNE, Nov. 1984, at
91. The trainer decided when the athlete would return to competition at 14% of
the schools; another physician, 5%; the coach, 1%; and a joint decision, 22%. Id. at
94. Although the survey did not address handicapped athletes, it is likely that
most surveyed schools would rely primarily on the team physician's participation
recommendation. See also Thornton, supra note 35, at 142 (reporting that most
high schools and colleges "have mechanisms for medical clearance whereby a
team physician can bar, or at least strongly discourage, at-risk athletes from
playing").
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with the team physician's recommendation.8 4 One private high school
claimed that permitting a handicapped athlete to play contrary to
unanimous physician recommendations against participation would vi-
olate its basic religious tenets. Explaining the basis of Moeller High
School's refusal to permit Stephen Larkin to play football with a heart
condition despite his family's willingness to sign a waiver, Daniel Con-
lon, chancellor for the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, stated, "We stand
for the preservation of human life... To put a student at risk against
the advice of [medical] specialists creates a moral problem."8 5
Some universities may permit an adult athlete with a handicap or
physical abnormality to decide whether to play if medical specialists
disagree in their participation recommendations. For example, Mark
Tingstad, a former Arizona State University football player, was diag-
nosed as having spinal stenosis, an abnormally narrow spinal canal.8 6
Physicians disagreed whether his condition increased his risk of suf-
fering permanent paralysis while playing football.87 Because the phy-
sicians' opinions were divided, Arizona State officials allowed Tingstad
to decide whether to continue playing football.88 Tingstad chose to
play football his senior year but quit after suffering temporary paraly-
sis while making a tackle during a game.8 9
Schools may fear that participation by a handicapped athlete may
increase the risk of injury to other participants in a sports event. For
example, a deaf football player may not be able to hear a changed
blocking assignment resulting in injury to a fellow team member.
Necessary medication or protective equipment for the handicapped
player also may expose participants to an increased risk of injury dur-
ing competition.
Schools also may be concerned about adverse publicity if a handi-
capped athlete suffers a severe injury or dies during athletics competi-
tion. Major college athletics powers have been criticized for deviating
from their educational mission by exploiting athletes in furtherance of
an obsession with winning.90 A tragedy on the playing field may cre-
84. See infra notes 249-50, 263-64 and accompanying text.
85. Mike Dodd, Who Decides Health Risk Is Too High?, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 5,1990, at
1C. See also infra notes 99-101, 190-99 and accompanying text.
86. Richard Demak, Was It Worth the Risk?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18, 1989, at
76.
87. Id. at 79-89.
88. Id. at 81.
89. Id. at 86-87.
90. See generally MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS, INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPART-
MENT VS. THE UNIvERsITY 297-306 (1990). But see Tom Witosky, College Athletes
Exploited? Not According to Recent Study, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 3, 1991, at 8C
(U.S. Education Department Study finding that student-athletes as successful as
other students regarding academic progress and employment history).
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ate the public perception that a school is willing to sacrifice its ath-
letes' health to accomplish its athletics objectives.
VI. ATHLETE'S LEGAL RIGHT TO PLAY
In most instances, athletes with handicaps or physical abnormali-
ties accept physician recommendations not to engage in competitive
sports to avoid exposing themselves to significant health risks. As an-
alyzed below, some athletes have claimed a legal right to play despite
the team physician's recommendation against playing. Athletes' right
to participation claims based on the federal Constitution pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 198391 and state common law9 2 generally have been unsuc-
cessful. However, amateur athletes have obtained court orders al-
lowing them to participate under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 197393 and state education statutes94 prohibiting discrimination
against the handicapped. Courts also have ordered schools to permit
handicapped interscholastic athletes to participate in athletics under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.95
Professional athletes successfully have challenged professional
sports league by-laws categorically prohibiting athletes with certain
physical impairments from playing under state employment discrimi-
nation laws.9 6 Courts have denied claims that such by-laws violate the
91. See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of equal protection
claims asserted by handicapped athletes. See infra notes 110-27 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of due process claims raised by handicapped athletes. In
Larkin v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, an unreported oral decision, a federal dis-
trict court held that a private high school's refusal to permit an athlete to play
football with a heart condition did not violate his First Amendment freedom of
association rights. The court found that the athlete's desire to play was "an even
balance" when weighed against the school's desire not to have the student on its
team. Partial Transcript of Proceedings at 25-26, Larkin v. Archdiocese of Cin-
cinnati, No. C-1-90-619 (S.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 31, 1990)(oral findings of fact and
conclusions of law supporting denial of injunctive relief and dismissal of com-
plaint) [hereinafter Partial Transcript]. See also infra notes 99-101, 190-99 and ac-
companying text.
92. The Larkin court rejected an athlete's claimed contractual right to play high
school football because the school exercised its retained right in its school hand-
book to determine eligibility for athletics participation in a reasonable and ra-
tional manner. Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at 3-4, 26-27. The Larkin court
also dismissed without prejudice plaintiff's tortious interference with prospective
contractual relations claim based on the athlete's concern he would not receive a
college athletics scholarship if he was unable to play high school football. Partial
Transcript, supra note 91, at 31-33.
93. See infra notes 212-19, 285-87 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 271-80 and accompanying text.
95. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1461 (West Supp. 1992). See generally Shepherd, supra note
50, at 195-98.
96. In Neeld v. American Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), the court
enjoined enforcement of a league by-law prohibiting one-eyed athletes from play-
ing hockey. The court found that the by-law violated New York's Human Rights
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federal antitrust laws.97
A. Federal Constitutional Claims98
1. Denial of Equal Protection
Some handicapped athletes have claimed that exclusion from
school athletics denies them equal protection of the laws. In addition
to a claim asserted under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,99 Larkin v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati raised an equal protection issue. In an un-
reported oral decision, the court upheld Cincinnati Moeller High
School's refusal to permit an athlete to play football without a physi-
cian's certification it was medically safe to play. 0 The court found no
equal protection violation because Moeller did not permit any athletes
to play football without a physician's certificate.103
In a 1977 case, Neeld v. American Hockey League,10 2 the court re-
jected plaintiff's claim that a professional hockey league's by-law ex-
cluding one-eyed players from member teams violated the equal
protection clause. The court opined that the league's by-law resulted
from private conduct, not state action subject to constitutional scru-
tiny. 03 In dicta the court noted, without explanation, that a visually
impaired athlete has an enforceable constitutional right not to be de-
nied participation in a college sports program because of a handicap if
such program constitutes state action.104
It is unlikely an athlete excluded from athletics participation be-
cause of a handicap today could assert an equal protection claim suc-
cessfully. The Supreme Court has ruled that handicapped persons are
not a suspect or quasi-suspect class justifying a heightened scrutiny of
alleged discrimination.105 Student athletes are not a suspect class,106
Law prohibiting employees from discrimination based on disability unless the
characteristic is a bona fide occupational qualification. Id at 462. There was no
evidence that blindness in one eye substantially detracted from plaintiff's ability
to play hockey. Id
97. In Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth
Circuit rejected plaintiff's claim that a professional hockey league by-law that
prevented him from playing for a member club violated the antitrust laws. The
court concluded that the by-law's primary purpose of promoting safety out-
weighed any de minimis anticompetitive effect on excluded athletes. Id at 1300.
98. For a discussion of state constitutional claims brought by handicapped athletes,
see Shepherd, supra note 50, at 185-87.
99. See infra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
100. Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at 16-17.
101. Id
102. 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D. N.Y. 1977).
103. I& at 461-62.
104. Id at 462. But see Grube v. Bethlehem Area School Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 423
(E.D. Pa. 1982)(expressing doubt that excluding handicapped students from high
school athletics denies equal protection of the laws).
105. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1984). In Cleburne,
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and apart from the Neeld dicta, 0 7 there is no judicially recognized
fundamental right to play college or high school sports.108
A school can justify the exclusion of handicapped athletes from its
athletics program if its decision is rationally related to a legitimate
objective.109 The school's reliance on its team physician's recommen-
dation that a handicapped athlete not play rationally furthers the per-
missible purpose of ensuring the health and safety of its athletes.
2. Denial of Due Process
Most courts hold there is no liberty or property interest in playing
interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics.110 The receipt of a college
athletics scholarship or possibility of a professional career generally is
viewed as a "unilateral expectation of a benefit," not "a legitimate
claim of entitlement."'l College and high school athletes thus usu-
ally are not entitled to due process in the context of exclusion from
athletics. However, depriving an athlete of an existing athletics schol-
arship may invoke the protections of due process.1 2
In Clayton v. University of Wyoming,113 a college football player
the court held that the mentally retarded were not a suspect class. The court
invalidated a city zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit to operate a
group home for the mentally retarded. The court found the ordinance did not
rationally further any of the city's legitimate interests.
106. See, e.g., Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082,1086-87 (10th Cir. 1983); Par-
ish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1975).
107. One commentator reports that Evans v. Looney, C.A. No. 77-6052-CV-SJ (W.D.
Mo., Sept. 2, 1977) resulted in a consent judgment that partially-blind football
players had been denied equal protection and due process by their exclusion from
a college team. See Shepherd, supra note 50, at 184 n.119.
108. Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082,1086-87 (10th Cir. 1983); Rivas Tenorio
v. Liga Athletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492, 497 (1st Cir. 1977); Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1028 (5th Cir. 1975).
109. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1984).
110. Rutledge v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1981); Hysaw v.
Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 945 (D. Kan. 1987); Hawkins v.
NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 610-11 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356,
366 (D. Ariz. 1983); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Col. 1976).
But see Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F.
Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972); Hall v. University of Minnesota, 530 F. Supp. 104 (D.
Minn. 1982). Some commentators argue that participation in athletics to obtain a
college scholarship or pursue a potential professional career should be a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest. William G. Buss, Due Process in the Enforce-
ment of Amateur Sports Rules, in LAw AND AMATEUR SPORTS 1, 11-12 (Ronald J.
Waicukauski ed., 1982); Schubert, supra note 23, at 67.
111. Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 610-11 (C.D. Ill. 1987)(quoting Board of Re-
gents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1972)).
112. Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981); Hysaw v.
Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D. Kan. 1987); Colorado Semi-
nary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 895 (D. Colo. 1976).
113. Complaint, Clayton v. University of Wyo., No. 118-167 (Laramie County Dist. Ct.,
filed Oct. 17, 1988).
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claimed the University of Wyoming's refusal to permit him to con-
tinue playing football with spinal stenosis denied him due process of
law. The university's football coach accepted the team physician's rec-
ommendation, supported by the opinions of other specialists, that
Steve Clayton discontinue playing football.114 Other examining physi-
cians believed it "would not be unreasonable" to permit Clayton to
continue playing football.115
In his complaint Clayton asserted defendants' action deprived him
of a potential professional football career.11 6 He claimed full knowl-
edge of his medical condition and a willingness to assume any en-
hanced risk of injury created by it.117
Before the court ruled on Clayton's request for injunctive relief,
the parties agreed to an administrative hearing before an ad hoc com-
mittee of university officials.118 The committee accepted the prevail-
ing view of medical experts that Clayton's participation in football
would create an "extra hazardous" risk of harm to him.119
The committee determined that university officials, namely the
head football coach who also served as athletics director, have the sole
discretion to determine a player's eligibility for the football team.12 0
It found the university has the authority to exclude from sports an
athlete whose physical condition exposes him to an increased risk of
injury, even if the athlete is willing to assume such risks.121 The com-
mittee concluded that the head football coach acted reasonably in ac-
cepting the team physician's recommendation to exclude Clayton from
the football team.12 2 After the university's president accepted the
committee's findings, Clayton voluntarily dismissed his suit.123
Although Clayton received an administrative hearing from the uni-
versity by agreement regarding his exclusion from the football team,
it is doubtful that under procedural due process he was entitled to one.
The university continued to honor his athletics scholarship. 12 4 The
expectation of a professional athletics career is speculative and does
114. Id at 2-3.
115. I& at 2.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id-
118. Telephone Interview with David L. Baker, University of Wyoming General Coun-
sel (Aug. 7, 1991).
119. In re Clayton, University of Wyoming's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law at 6 (Dec. 22, 1988).
120. IH at 5, 7.
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id-
123. Telephone Interview with David L. Baker, University of Wyoming General Coun-
sel (Aug. 7, 1991).
124. Telephone Interview with Dan Viola, University of Wyoming Assistant Athletics
Director (July 24, 1991).
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not constitute a property right worthy of due process protection. 2 5
The Constitution does not require a high school or college to hold an
administrative hearing before excluding an impaired or handicapped
student from athletics competition based on the team physician's
recommendation.126
Handicapped athletes probably could not successfully claim exclu-
sion from interscholastic or intercollegiate sports violates substantive
due process. As previously discussed, there is no fundamental right to
participate in college or high school sports. 27 A school could ration-
ally justify such exclusion based on concern for the athlete's health
and well being.
B. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Claims128
Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act (Act) provides in relevant
part:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as
defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handi-
cap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance .... 129
The purpose of the Act is to provide a "guarantee of equal opportu-
nity"13 0 and "even handed treatment of qualified handicapped per-
sons."
3 1 The Act is primarily intended to provide the handicapped
with an opportunity to participate fully in activities in which they
have the physical capability and skill to perform.
3 2
Section 504 of the Act is patterned after similar federal statutes
prohibiting racial and sexual discrimination. 3 3 The Act implements
125. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
126. One commentator suggests that, at a minimum, an injured or ill college student
excluded from athletics competition is entitled to an explanation of the institu-
tion's decision and a summary of its supporting evidence. The athlete should be
given an opportunity to present medical evidence supporting a request to partici-
pate in intercollegiate athletics. Jones, supra note 34, at 175.
127. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
128. For a discussion of potential claims by handicapped athletes under the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, see Jones, supra note 34, at 189-97.
129. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West Supp. 1992).
130. 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 (West Supp. 1992).
131. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979).
132. The objective of the Act is to prevent discrimination based on an assumed "inabil-
ity to function in a particular context." Southeastern Community College v. Da-
vis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 (1979). For a discussion of the beneficial rehabilitative
effects of athletics participation by handicapped persons, see generally Glen M.
Davis et al., Sports And Recreation For the Physically Disabled, in SPoRTs M .
186 (R. Strauss ed., 1984).
133. S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373. Com-
pare Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 200 d-1 (1985), prohib-
iting race, color or national origin discrimination, and Section 901 of the
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federal government policy prohibiting programs receiving federal fi-
nancial assistance from discriminating on the basis of handicap.13 4
Regulations promulgated under the Act by the Department of Ed-
ucation1 3 5 and the Department of Health and Human Services136 pro-
hibit colleges and high schools from discriminating against qualified
handicapped athletes. Qualified handicapped athletes must be given
an "equal opportunity for participation" in interscholastic and inter-
collegiate athletics.137
Entities in violation of the Act must take remedial action pre-
scribed by the Director of the Office of Civil Rights for the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services or Assistant Secretary of
Education.138 If the entity refuses to take required remedial action,
judicial sanctions or termination of federal funding may result.139
Private parties have a right of action under the Act and may obtain
injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees.140 Handicapped ath-
letes have obtained judicial orders requiring schools to permit them to
participate in competitive sports.141 Courts have held that handi-
capped athletes may recover damages under the Act for unlawful ex-
clusion from a sport.142
To prevail under the Act, a handicapped athlete must establish
that he or she is: 1) an "individual with handicaps;" 2) "otherwise
qualified" to participate; 3) who has been excluded solely by reason of
handicap; 4) from a program or activity receiving federal funds.143
The athletics programs of most colleges and high schools are covered
Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1683 (1985), prohibiting sex discrimi-
nation, with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1985), prohibit-
ing discrimination against the handicapped. See generally School Bd. of Nassau
County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277-78 and n.2 (1987)(discussing purpose of
Act and similarity to other federal antidiscrimination statutes).
134. S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373.
135. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.37(c) and 104.47(a)(1992).
136. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.37(c) and 84.47(a)(1992).
137. See supra notes 135, 136 and accompanying text. The Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 (1988), and the Amateur Sports Act of 1978,
36 U.S.C. §§ 371 et seq. (1988), also ensure equal opportunities in athletics pro-
grams for handicapped persons. See generally G. WONG, EssENTIALs OF AMATEUR
SPORTS LAw 261-66 (1988).
138. 34 C.F.R. § 104.6(a)(1992); 45 C.F.R. § 84.6(a)(1992).
139. 34 C.F.R. Pt. 104, App A. at 422 (1992); 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84, App. A at 380 (1992).
140. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a (West 1985). See, e.g., Doe v. United States Attorney Gen., 941
F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1991).
141. See, e.g., Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418,425 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
142. Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 949 (D. N.J. 1980).
143. See Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1522 (11th Cir. 1991); Doe v. New York
Univ., 666 F.2d 761,774-75 (2d Cir. 1981); Sharon v. Larson, 650 F. Supp. 1396,1400
(E.D. Pa. 1986); Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731, 741 (D.R.I. 1984); Wright v.
Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
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by the Act even if they do not receive any direct federal funding. If
any part of a college or high school receives federal financial assist-
ance, all of its operations and programs are covered by the Act.144
1. "Individual with Handicaps"
The Act prohibits discrimination against an "individual with handi-
caps" defined as any person who: "i) has a physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities; ii) has a record of such an impairment, or iii) is re-
garded as having such an impairment." 14 5 The Act protects persons
who are actually handicapped, labeled as handicapped after recovery
from their former condition, or perceived as handicapped.146
The Act's regulations define "physical impairment" as: "any physi-
ological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological;
musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including speech
organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic
and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine..."147 The regulations do not list
specific diseases or conditions that constitute a "physical impairment,"
but courts have defined this term broadly.148 Numerous physical dis-
orders, illnesses, abnormalities, or conditions that may form the basis
144. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794(b)(West Supp. 1992). In 1988, the Act was amended to ensure
"that when federal financial assistance is extended to any part of a college, uni-
versity, other postsecondary institution, or public system of higher education, all
of the operations of the institution or education system are covered." S. REP. No.
64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 18. This amendment
was in response to the Supreme Court's 1984 holding that Section 504 prohibits
discrimination only by an institution's specific programs that receive federal
funds. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984). Prior to Darrone,
some courts held that intercollegiate and interscholastic athletics programs were
covered by the Act although they did not receive direct federal funding. Wright
v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 791-92 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Poole v. South Plain-
field Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. N.J. 1980).
145. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B)(West Supp. 1992). See also 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(1992); 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(1992)(same definition for "handicapped person"). On Oct. 21,
1986, the Act was amended to substitute "individual with handicaps" for "handi-
capped individual," wherever appearing. Pub. L. 99-506, § 103(d)(2)(B)(1986).
146. S. REP. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. News 6373,
6388-89.
147. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i)(A)(1992); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(A)(1992). See 34
C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i)(B)(1992) and 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i)(B)(1992) for the defi-
nition of "mental impairment."
148. The Supreme Court recently adopted the regulation's broad definition of a "phys-
ical impairment" by holding that tuberculosis was a "physiological disorder or
condition" affecting plaintiff's respiratory system. School Bd. of Nassau County
Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,279 (1987). See also E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F.
Supp. 1088,1098 (D. Haw. 1980)("impairment" means "any condition which weak-
ens, diminishes, or restricts or otherwise damages an individual's health or physi-
cal or mental activity.").
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of a school's refusal to permit an athlete to play competitive sports are
"physical impairments" under the Act. For example, a heart condi-
tion,Z49 a congenital back abnormality,150 permanent osteoarthritis of
a knee joint,15 ' knee and back injuries, 52 hip and foot injuries, 53 and
loss of a paired organ'5 4 are all judicially designated as "physical im-
pairments" under the Act.
Courts have held that mere physical incapability of performing
particular activities does not constitute an "impairment."ss Being too
weak to play football or too short to play basketball is not a "physical
impairment" for purposes of the Act.1 5 6
A physical impairment must "substantially limit one or more of
such person's major life activities." 5 7 The term "substantially limits"
is not defined in the Act or its regulations. The regulations define
"major life activities" to include "caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working." 5 8 Athletics, which require the performance of strenu-
ous manual tasks, constitute a "major life activity" for many people. 5 9
2. "Otherwise Qualified" and Excluded "Solely by Reason of
Handicap"
In suits brought by handicapped athletes seeking to participate in
competitive sports, the key issues generally are whether the athlete is
"otherwise qualified" to participate in athletics and has been excluded
149. Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at 3, 15 (hypertrophic cardiomyopathy); Bento
v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731, 741 (D. R.I. 1984)(coronary bypass); Bey v.
Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1982)(cardiovascular disease).
150. E. E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (D. Haw. 1980).
151. Guinn v. Bolger, 598 F. Supp. 196, 198 (D.D.C. 1984).
152. Taylor v. United States Postal Service, 946 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1991).
153. Hall v. United States Postal Service, 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988).
154. For vision in only one eye see Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977)
and Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981). For cases involv-
ing only one functioning kidney see Seay v. Trustees of the Cal. St. Univ. and
Colleges, No. CV89-4971 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 5, 1989), Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982), and Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ.,
490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980). See generally Note, The Rehabilitation Act of 1973;
Focusing on the Definition of a Handicapped Individual, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 149, 150-51 (1988)(listing handicapping conditions under Act).
155. Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir. 1985).
156. Id. at 1249. Cf. E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1100 (D. Haw.
1980)(5'5" individual incapable of playing center for the New York Knicks has
physical impairment but is not "otherwise qualified" handicapped individual).
157. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B)(West 1985); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(1992); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(j)(1992).
158. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii)(1992); 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii)(1992).
159. Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (involvement in contact sports is "major life activit[y]" for plaintiff elemen-
tary school student).
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"solely by reason of handicap." In Southeastern Community College v.
Davis,160 the Supreme Court held that an educational institution may
require a person to possess "reasonable physical qualifications" to par-
ticipate in its programs and activities. Although "mere possession of a
handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an inability to func-
tion," a school need "not lower or substantially modify its standards to
accommodate a handicapped person."161 An individual is "otherwise
qualified" if "able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of
his handicap."162
In Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court clarified Davis by
stating:
Davis thus struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped
to be integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in
preserving the integrity of their programs: while a grantee need not be re-
quired to make "fundamental" or "substantial" modifications to accommodate
the handicapped, it may be required to make "reasonable" ones.1 6 3
It thus appears that an athlete is "otherwise qualified" if able to meet
a school's requirements after reasonable accommodation in light of a
handicap.164
In School Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline,165 the Supreme
Court explained: "The Act is carefully structured to replace such re-
flexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based
on reasoned and medically sound judgments ... ." In determining
160. 442 U.S. 397, 414 (1979). In Davis, the court held that the Act did not require a
college's nursing program to admit an applicant with hearing problems. The
court found that the applicant could not satisfy the school's legitimate physical
qualifications necessary for patient safety during the program's clinical phase.
161. Id at 405 and 413.
162. Id at 406, 407 n.7 (emphasis added). Quoting Appendix A of the Act's regula-
tions, the Supreme Court explained that "otherwise qualified" does not mean
"qualified except for their handicap":
Paragraph (k) of § 84.3 defines the term "qualified handicapped per-
son." Throughout the regulation this term is used instead of the statu-
tory term "otherwise qualified handicapped person." The Department
believes that the omission of the word "otherwise" is necessary in order
to comport with the intent of the statute because, read literally, "other-
wise" qualified handicapped persons include persons who are qualified
except for their handicap, rather than in spite of their handicap. Under
such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all the qualifications for
driving a bus except sight could be said to be "otherwise qualified" for
the job of driving. Clearly, such a result was not intended by Congress.
In all other respects, the terms "qualified" and "otherwise qualified" are
intended to be interchangeable. 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, App. A., p. 405 (1978).
Id at 407 n.7.
163. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
164. Jones, supra note 34, at 181-82.
165. 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987). In Arline, the court held that a person with tuberculosis
was a "handicapped individual under the Act." The court remanded the case to
determine whether plaintiff was "otherwise qualified" for employment as a
school teacher considering the risk of transmitting tuberculosis to others.
HeinOnline  -- 71 Neb. L. Rev. 1011 1992
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
whether an individual is "otherwise qualified," she or he is entitled to
an "opportunity to have [one's] condition evaluated in light of medical
evidence."166 The decision to exclude an individual from a particular
program or activity must be based on "reasonable medical judgments
given the state of medical knowledge."167 The nature, duration, and
severity of the harm likely to result from the handicapped individual's
participation in an activity are factors to be considered.168
a. Physical Inability to Perform
In Wolff v. South Colonie Central School District, 1 6 9 the district
court held a high school's refusal to permit a student with a severe
congenital limb deficiency to participate in a trip to Spain did not vio-
late the Act. The court found plaintiff unable to satisfy the physical
requirements of the trip consisting of extensive walking and stair
climbing.170 The court concluded plaintiff was not "otherwise quali-
fied" under the Act.171
The Wolff court's rationale may be applicable in many cases in
which athletes seek to play on teams with non-handicapped individu-
als. Athletes with severe handicaps or impairments often do not have
the minnmunm physical skills or abilities required for the sport or play
well enough to compete successfully. A handicapped athlete is not
"otherwise qualified" if physically unable to perform or function ef-
fectively in a particular sport. Such an individual would not satisfy
the Davis requirement of physical capability of performing an activity
in spite of a handicap.172
Even if physically capable of participating in a given sport, a handi-
capped athlete must present evidence tending to show exclusion
"solely by reason of handicap." 7 3 Exclusion based on "misconcep-
tions or unfounded factual conclusions" or reasons founded on "unjus-
tified consideration of the handicap itself" is prohibited by the Act.17 4
A school may justify exclusion only for legitimate reasons other than
166. Ik at 285. See also Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495,1526 (11th Cir. 1991)("individ-
ualized inquiry and findings of fact" necessary to determine whether handi-
capped person is "otherwise qualified").
167. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987).
168. Id.
169. 534 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. N.Y. 1982), aff'd without opin., 714 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1982).
170. Id. at 761.
171. Id. at 762. Accord Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 643 (2d Cir. 1991)(handicapped
person not "otherwise qualified" if medical evidence shows physical inability to
perform job's essential functions); Florence v. Frank, 774 F. Supp. 1054, 1061
(N.D. Tex. 1991)("If the plaintiff's handicap would prevent him from doing the
job in question, he cannot be found to be 'otherwise qualified.' ").
172. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
173. Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
174. Id.
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the athlete's handicap to avoid liability under the Act.175
b. Harm to Other Participants
Consistent with Davis and Arline, preventing harm to other par-
ticipants is a valid ground for refusing to permit handicapped athletes
to play a particular sport.176 Exclusion necessary to permit others'
safe participation in a sporting event does not violate the Act.177 A
school need not substantially modify its standards by changing the
rules of play or reducing the quality of team play merely to enable a
handicapped athlete to participate in a sport.1TS These justifications
do not constitute exclusion from participation "solely by reason of
handicap."
Courts have held that Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) is a "physical impairment" under the Act.179 In Doe v. Dolton
Elementary School District No. 148,180 the court enjoined a school
from excluding a child with AIDS from regular classes. The court also
permitted the child to participate in school extra-curricular activities
except for contact sports.1 8 ' The court found "no significant risk of
transmission of AIDS in the classroom setting" based on medical testi-
mony,182 but made no finding regarding the risk of transmission dur-
ing contact sports.
In Arline, the Supreme Court held the Act does not prohibit dispa-
rate treatment of the handicapped necessary to avoid "exposing others
to significant health and safety risks."18 3 Exclusion of persons with
contagious diseases from certain activities must be based on "reason-
able medical judgments" regarding the nature, duration and severity
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
177. See Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418,419 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See
also Cavallaro v. Ambach, 575 F. Supp. 171 (W.D.N. Y. 1983)(upholding rule
prohibiting 19 year old with neurological handicap from wrestling because advan-
tage in physical maturity may cause injury to younger wrestlers); Mahan v. Agee,
652 P.2d 765 (Okla. 1982)(same). Accord Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1527
(11th Cir. 1991) (prison has legitimate interest in excluding prisoners with AIDS
from certain activities to prevent exposure of others to significant health risks).
178. See Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 419 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Although a school is not required to make "fundamental or substantial" modifica-
tions to its athletics programs to accommodate handicapped athletes, it may be
required to make "reasonable" ones. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300
(1985).
179. See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct. Cent. Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
1988); Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Calif.
1987).
180. 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. IlM. 1988).
181. Id at 449.
182. Id. at 445.
183. School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987).
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of the risk of harm to others and the probability of transmission. 8 4
Therefore, the Doe court improperly excluded the child from partici-
pation in contact sports without any supporting medical testimony
concerning the risk of AIDS transmission during such activities.18 5
c. Harm to Handicapped Athlete
Neither the Act nor its implementing regulations directly address
whether enhanced risk of injury to a handicapped athlete is a legally
valid reason for exclusion from school-sponsored athletics. Courts are
divided on whether prevention of possible future injury to a handi-
capped athlete as the only justification for exclusion from competitive
sports is permissible under the Act. 8 6 Schools fear tort liability for
injury to handicapped or impaired athletes permitted to play contrary
to the team physician's recommendation. 8 7 Schools also may assert a
paternalistic duty to protect the athlete's health that extends beyond
merely ensuring the athlete is fully informed of the risks of playing
with a handicap.'8 8
i. No physician participation approval
Most colleges and high schools require athletes to pass a physical
exam by the team physician before participating in competitive
sports.189 Although unable to satisfy all requirements of a physical
exam, an athlete may have the physical ability and skills to play a
particular sport despite a physical abnormality or handicap. The ath-
lete may be able to play without increasing the risk of harm to other
participants or adversely affecting the quality of team play. Under
these circumstances, some athletes have claimed a legal right to par-
ticipate under the Act because they are "otherwise qualified" to play a
given sport in spite of their handicap.
One athlete asserted a right to play high school football under the
Act despite unanimous agreement by examining physicians that he
should not play with a serious heart condition. In Larkin v. Archdio-
cese of Cincinnati,190 Stephen Larkin, an exceptional athlete with the
physical skills to play football despite having hypertrophic cardio-
184. Id. at 288. Even if a handicapped person's participation in an activity creates a
significant risk of harm to others, exclusion is illegal if reasonable accommoda-
tion will eliminate the risk. Id. See also Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct. Cent.
Dist. of Cal., 840 F.2d 701, 708 n.11 (9th Cir. 1988).
185. See generally Matthew J. Mitten, AIDS and Athletics, 2 Seton Hall J. Sports L.
(1993) (in press).
186. See infra notes 190-99, 203-19 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 257-62, 266-70 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 249-51, 263-64 and accompanying text; supra notes 84-85 and ac-
companying text.
189. See supra notes 21, 26-29, 83 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 91.
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myopathy (HCM), claimed Cincinnati Moeller High School's refusal to
allow him to do so violated the Act. Individuals with HCM have an
increased risk of sudden death, and all physicians, including Larkin's
personal doctor, recommended against playing football.191
The Larkin family was fully aware of the risks of Stephen's partici-
pation and willing to waive any tort claims against the school if Ste-
phen were permitted to play football.192 They argued Stephen was not
in the high risk category of those with HCM, and there was no evi-
dence strenuous activity increased the risk of sudden death.193 They
also relied on statistics showing fatalities from physiological condi-
tions were no more likely than from contact or collisions inherent in
football.194 In addition, they noted that, after being diagnosed as hav-
ing HCM, Stephen regularly had run and lifted weights without any
adverse effects.195
Judge Herman J. Weber found Stephen was an "individual with
handicaps" under the Act.196 The court held Moeller's acceptance of
unanimous physician recommendations that Stephen not play football
did not violate the Act.197 The court reasoned that Stephen's inability
to satisfy an Ohio High School Athletics Association by-law requiring
"a physician certification" before participation in interscholastic ath-
letics was a "substantial justification" for the school's decision. 198 The
court also observed that, under Ohio law, Stephen's parents could not
waive their minor son's legal rights.199
Larkin is consistent with the Supreme Court's School Board of
Nassau County, Ma. v. Arline holding that decisions to exclude the
191. Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at 3, 6, 8.
192. Id. at 11-12.
193. Id. at 8-10.
194. Id. at 8-9. The court found that the low death rate due to physiological causes
resulted from requiring competent physical exams and physician approval before
permitting participation in athletics. Id.
195. Id. at 6-7.
196. Id. at 15-16.
197. Id. at 16. The plaintiffs filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit but subsequently voluntarily dismissed it. Telephone Interview
with Kenneth S. Resnick, Counsel for the Archdiocese of Cincinnati (May 15,
1991).
198. See Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at 16. After graduating from high school,
Stephen Larkin accepted a baseball scholarship from the University of Texas. In
April 1992, university athletics officials refused to allow him to play in several
games because of concerns about his heart condition. After Larkin and his par-
ents signed a waiver, he was permitted to continue playing baseball. Physicians
again cleared Larkin to play baseball after he underwent additional cardiovascu-
lar tests during the offseason. Texas'Larkin Cleared For Baseball, Hous. CHRON.,
July 1, 1992, at 9C; UTSays Larkin Can Play, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 25,1992, at 4C;
Dodds: Concern is Larken's Health, Not Liability, AUsTIN AMERICAN-STATES-
MAN, Apr. 22, 1992, at Cl.
199. Id. at 11-12.
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handicapped from programs or activities be based on "reasonable med-
ical judgments."200 Stephen Larkin was unable to obtain certification
from any physician that he was physically fit to play football. Requir-
ing schools to permit handicapped athletes to participate in a sport
contrary to all examining physicians' recommendations would violate
the Alexander v. Choate admonition that recipients of federal funds
need not make "fundamental or substantial" modifications to accom-
modate the handicapped.2 01 High schools and colleges may exclude
handicapped athletes from participation in a given sport without phy-
sician approval because the Act, as judicially construed, does not pro-
vide an unqualified right to participate in athletics.
ii. Conflicting physician participation recommendations
Difficult issues arise if a handicapped athlete has the physical skill
to play a given sport without increasing the risk of harm to other par-
ticipants, but physicians differ in their participation recommendations.
The Larkin court observed that Moeller's insistence that Stephen
Larkin pass a physical exam by a particular physician would present
an "entirely different fact situation." 202 Courts have divided on the
question of whether a school's requirement that a handicapped athlete
obtain participation approval from the team physician violates the Act
if another competent physician approves participation.
Courts initially upheld a school's reliance on the team physician's
recommendation against a handicapped athlete's participation in a
particular sport. In a 1977 case, Kampmeier v. Nyquist,20 3 the Second
Circuit ruled that a high school's refusal to permit one-eyed athletes
to play contact sports complied with the Act despite conflicting physi-
cian participation recommendations. The court held the team physi-
cian's recommendation against participation was a "substantial
justification" for the school's decision.204
In 1978, the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) of the Department of
Education issued a policy interpretation of regulations requiring that
handicapped athletes be given "an equal opportunity for participation"
in high school sports.205 This policy interpretation prohibits schools
from categorically excluding athletes that have lost an organ, limb or
appendage from contact sports. 206 A school cannot "assume that such
200. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
202. Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at 31.
203. 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
204. Id, at 299.
205. OCR Policy Interpretation No. 5, Participation of Handicapped Students in Con-
tact Sports, reprinted in Shepherd, supra note 50, at 190-91 n.164 [hereinafter
Policy Interpretation].
206. I- Guideline 3A of the NCAA's 1992-93 Sports Medicine Handbook provides for
"serious consideration of the risks and benefits of athletics participation" by ath-
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a child is too great a risk for physical injury or illness if permitted to
participate in contact sports."207 The athlete "may be required to ob-
tain parental consent and approval for participation from the doctor
most familiar with his or her condition."208
The Act permits "otherwise qualified" athletes with a single paired
organ to participate in sports if reasonable accommodation through
the use of safety equipment will protect the athlete from future in-
jury.2 09 For example, safety goggles 210 or flak jackets211 or other pad-
ding may protect athletes with one eye or kidney from injury during
contact sports.
In recent years courts have expanded the right of handicapped ath-
letes to participate in interscholastic and intercollegiate sports. Most
reported cases involve athletes seeking to play contact sports despite a
missing or impaired kidney or eye.
In Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education,212 the court re-
fused to dismiss an athlete's complaint that his high school's refusal to
permit him to wrestle with only one kidney violated the Act. The
court rejected the school's argument that the athlete was not "other-
wise qualified" because he was unable to pass the team physician's
exam with one kidney.213 The court found plaintiff qualified to wres-
tle because he was capable of meeting the sport's training require-
ments and another "respectable medical authority" cleared him for
participation.2 14
Similarly, in Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District,215 the court
held a high school's decision to exclude an excellent athlete with one
kidney from football based on its team physician's recommendation
violated the Act. The court found no "substantial justification" for de-
nying participation because plaintiff's physician concluded "there is
letes with a missing or nonfunctioning paired organ and lists several factors to be
considered by the athlete, team physician and school. HANDBOOK, supra note 16,
at 34. For physician opinions regarding participation in contact sports with a sin-
gle paired organ, see Peter J. Dorsen, Should Athletes With One Eye, Kidney or
Testicle Play Contact Sports?, THE PHYsICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, July 1986, at
130, and James Mandell et al., Sports-Related Genitourinary Injuries in Chil-
dren, CLi-IcAL SPORTS MED., Nov. 1982, at 483, 491-93.
207. Policy Interpretation, supra note 205.
208. I&
209. Jones, supra note 34, at 206.
210. See, e.g., Kampmeier v. Harris, 411 N.Y.S.2d 744, 746 (1978). Guideline 4B of the
NCAA's 1992-93 Sports Medicine Handbook provides that all one-eyed athletes
participating in collision or contact sports should wear eye protection. HAND-
BOOK, supra note 16, at 44-45.
211. Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 420-22 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see
infra note 215 and accompanying text.
212. 490 F. Supp. 948 (D. N.J. 1980).
213. Id. at 953.
214. Id.
215. 550 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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no medical reason why [he] cannot play football."2 16
In Wright v. Columbia University,217 the court held that the Act
required a university to permit an outstanding athlete with sight in
only one eye to play football. Accepting the testimony of plaintiff's
ophthalmologist that "no substantial risk of serious eye injury related
to football exists," the court rejected the school's reliance on the team
physician's contrary conclusion.218 The court found that plaintiff was
"otherwise qualified" to play and the university was not forced to
"lower or ... effect substantial modifications of its standards."219
It is arguable that, even if a handicapped athlete has the skill to
play the desired sport, requiring an athlete to pass the team physi-
cian's medical exam is a "reasonable physical qualification" consistent
with the Act as interpreted by Southeastern Community College v.
Davis.220 The school's participation decision is based on the "reason-
able medical judgment" of the team physician based on an individual-
ized examination of the athlete as required by School Board of Nassau
County, FMa. v. Arline22 l and not on categorical exclusion because of
the athlete's handicap.
On the other hand, the Act provides handicapped persons with a
legal right to participate fully in activities in which they have the
physical capability and skill to perform. 22 2 Neither the Act nor its
regulations223 expressly provide that a school's concern for a handi-
216. Id. at 424. Accord Seay v. Trustees of the Cal. State Univ. and Colleges, No. CV-
89-4971 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 1990)(order denying preliminary injunction and sup-
porting findings of fact and conclusions of law). In Seay, a federal district court
refused to order Long Beach State University to permit an athlete with one kid-
ney to play intercollegiate football. The plaintiff was a two-year starter on the
school's football team and possessed "above average skills." Id. at 1. He lost a
kidney when he was shot protecting his niece from a would-be killer. Medical
evidence did not conclusively establish whether plaintiff's remaining kidney was
functioning normally. The court found no violation of the Act because plaintiff
was not excluded from football "solely by reason of his handicap." Id. at 2-3. In
March 1990, Mark Seay settled his suit against Long Beach State. The school
agreed to allow him to play football if he agreed to wear a flak jacket while play-
ing and sign a waiver of any tort claims. See generally, Shelley Smith, Not What
The Doctor Ordered, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 11, 1990, Viewpoint; Scorecard,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 7, 1990, at 14.
217. 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
218. Id. at 793.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text. It also may be argued that passing
the team physician's physical examination is a "technical standard" required for
participation in a nonacademic activity, which an athlete must satisfy to be a
"qualified handicapped person" under the Department of Education and Health
and Human Services regulations. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(3)(1992); 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.3(k)(3)(1992).
221. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
223. The Supreme Court repeatedly has characterized the federal regulations
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capped athlete's health and safety justifies exclusion from interscho-
lastic or intercollegiate sports. An OCR policy interpretation
prohibits exclusion of athletes with a single paired organ if the physi-
cian most familiar with a handicapped athlete's condition approves
participation in athletics.224
A school has a rational basis for excluding a handicapped athlete
from participation consistent with the team physician's recommenda-
tion. Unlike the federal Constitution, the Act, however, requires
more than merely a rational basis for discriminating against a handi-
capped athlete.225 Courts have held that a school may exclude a hand-
icapped athlete with the requisite physical ability and skills from
participation in a particular sport only for a "substantial justifica-
tion."226 Moreover, a school has a legal obligation to make reasonable
accommodations to enable a handicapped athlete to participate in
athletics.227
iii. Handicapped adult athletes: Some recommendations
One commentator has proposed that the Act be construed to per-
mit a college to exclude a handicapped person from athletics participa-
tion presenting a "substantial risk of life-threatening injury" to the
athlete.228 Athletics participation posing "a substantial risk of irre-
versible serious bodily injury or death" could be prohibited by a col-
lege.229 This proposal is consistent with a similar judicial standard
regarding permissible exclusion of handicapped persons from covered
employment opportunities under the Rehabilitation Act.230
designed to implement the Rehabilitation Act as "an important source of gui-
dance on the meaning of § 504." See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304 n.24
(1985)(quoted in School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987)
and in Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 549 n.10 (1988)).
224. See supra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
225. Jacobson v. Delta Airlines, 742 F.2d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1062 (1985); Pushkin v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1383 (10th
Cir. 1981); Casey v. Lewis, 773 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 (D. Ariz. 1991).
226. See, e.g., Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977); Grube v. Bethle-
hem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Wright v. Columbia
Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 793 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at
16.
227. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
228. Jones, supra note 34, at 212.
229. Id. at 206.
230. See, e.g., Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1991)("genuine
substantial risk that he or she could be injured"); Carter v. Casa Cent., 849 F.2d
1048, 1054 (7th Cir. 1988)("significant risk of harm to themselves"); Mantolete v.
Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985)("reasonable probability of substantial
injury"). These cases rely on an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
regulation that defines a "qualified handicapped person" as one who can perform
the essential functions of a job "without endangering the health and safety of the
individual." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f)(1992).
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The above proposal is appealing and workable in most instances.
For example, the Larkin court upheld a high school's exclusion of a
student with hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM) from athletics par-
ticipation based on unanimous physician agreement that such partici-
pation was life threatening.2 31 However, it is an unsatisfactory
standard when physicians reach differing conclusions regarding the
nature and severity of the medical risks of athletics participation by a
particular individual with a physical abnormality. For example, ex-
amining specialists conflicted in their recommendations regarding
participation in contact sports by college athletes with HCM232 or spi-
nal stenosis233 based on their differing evaluations of the medical risks
and the individual athlete's physical condition.
In many instances, there is no definite scientific answer or univer-
sal agreement that increased health risks created by certain handicaps
or disabilities preclude participation in certain competitive sports.23 4
Based on their individual experience and professional judgment, com-
petent physicians may reach different credible conclusions regarding
the nature and severity of the risks of participation based on a handi-
capped athlete's unique physiological characteristics.2 3 Although
Hank Gathers died while playing college basketball with an irregular
heartbeat,23 6 Terry Cummings has played professional basketball for
several years with an irregular heartbeat. 23 7
Strict adherence to their paramount obligation to protect the ath-
lete's health and well being should ensure that physicians formulate
medically sound athletics participation recommendations.235 Fear of
malpractice liability should deter physicians from providing participa-
tion recommendations enabling physically impaired athletes to take
life-threatening or other unreasonable health risks.239
A university has a substantial justification for excluding from ath-
letics participation a handicapped adult who has not obtained a compe-
tent physician's approval to play a given sport.240 A school also has a
231. See supra notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 203-19 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 5, 46-47 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. A physician may require an athlete
to waive contractually any legal rights against the physician as a condition for
clearing a handicapped athlete to participate. A court, however, may refuse to
enforce a waiver of legal claims arising out of physician negligence. See, e.g., O1-
son v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1979); Belshaw v. Feinstein, 65 Cal. Rptr.
788 (1968).
240. The Larkin court's holding that a high school's refusal to permit a minor to play
school-sponsored sports consistent with unanimous physician recommendations
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substantial justification to exclude an athlete who is not fully in-
formed of the health risks of participation in a sport and capable of
making a rational decision under the circumstances. 241 A university
should ensure that the athlete is given understandable information by
competent medical personnel concerning the nature and severity of
the risk of participation in a particular sport with his or her physical
abnormality or illness.242
An athlete should be encouraged to ask questions regarding his or
her handicapping condition and to bring family members or friends to
the disclosure sessions for support and assistance. 243 University offi-
cials should test an athlete's comprehension of the provided informa-
tion, perhaps by requiring the athlete to write down her or his
understanding of the pertinent risk of athletics participation.24 4 The
university also should create an atmosphere for informed decision-
making that minimizes the pressures on the athlete to participate.245
A college has no substantial justification for excluding a handi-
capped adult from school-sponsored athletics if competent physicians
reach conflicting participation recommendations based on an individu-
alized physical examination and different evaluation of the medical
risks. A university may violate the Act's reasonable accommodation
requirement if it refuses to permit a handicapped athlete to participate
in a sport in accordance with the team physician's recommendation
but contrary to another competent physician's credible recom-
mendation.
Both federal and state courts recently have held that college stu-
dents are adults fully capable of, and responsible for, making their
own decisions.246 These courts declined to impose a duty on colleges
to protect students from the consequences of their own voluntary
decisions.
The Act prohibits a university from substituting its decision for a
against playing also should apply to handicapped adults under similar circum-
stances. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
241. Accord Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 953-54 (D. N.J.
1980)(high school officials have duty to alert athlete and parents to dangers of
participation and "require them to deal with the matter rationally").
242. Jones, supra note 34, at 200; Thomas G. Allison, Counseling Athletes at Risk for
Sudden Death, Tim PHYsIcIAN & SpoRTSMEDIciNE, June 1992, at 140.
243. Jones, supra note 34, at 200.
244. Id. at 145, 200-201. Guideline 3A of the NCAA's 1992-93 Sports Medicine Hand-
book provides that impaired athletes should sign a document of understanding
and a release of claims acknowledging the risks of athletics participation with the
subject impairment. HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 35.
245. Jones, supra note 34, at 201-202. See supra notes 30-39 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the pressures often faced by amateur athletes to participate in
sports.
246. See, eg., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979); Beach v. University of
Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); Baldwin v. Zoradi, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1981).
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considered decision of a fully-informed adult athlete to participate in
athletics supported by a credible medical opinion.247 Handicapped
adult athletes capable of weighing the known risks and potential bene-
fits have the right under the Act to choose to participate in competi-
tive sports. This position is consistent with the principle that sound-
minded adults have the legal right to accept or refuse medical treat-
ment even if others disagree with their decision.248
Courts have rejected claims by universities that paternalistic con-
cerns regarding a handicapped athlete's increased risk of injury justify
exclusion from intercollegiate sports.249 In Wright v. Columbia Uni-
versity, the court explained:
Columbia has never asserted that it would be harmed by plaintiff's intercolle-
giate football career; rather, it has premised its decision to exclude him on the
understandable belief that plaintiff should avoid contact sports which might
render him sightless and that he should properly concentrate on obtaining an
education while at Columbia. Such motives, while laudably evidencing Co-
lumbia's concern for its students' well-being, derogate from the rights secured
to plaintiff under Section 504, which prohibits "paternalistic authorities" from
deciding that certain activities are "too risky" for a handicapped person.2 5 0
A private university may assert that its basic religious tenets are
violated if the Act enables a handicapped athlete to participate in ath-
letics contrary to the opinion of the team physician that significant
health risks justify exclusion. For example, Notre Dame University
could contend that the Act requires deviation from its Catholic tradi-
tion of preserving human life if a handicapped athlete has a right to
participate in a given sport under such circumstances.2 5 1
Either a public or private university may claim that an opportunity
to play on its athletics teams is based solely on a consensual relation-
ship between the school and athlete.2 5 2 A university also may fear
receiving adverse publicity if a handicapped athlete suffers a serious
247. Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 953-54 (D. N.J. 1980).
248. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990); Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on other grounds, Bing v. Thunig, 143
N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
249. See, e.g., Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 300 n.9 (2d Cir. 1977)(handicapped
college athlete "old enough to weigh risks and make [participation] decision for
himself"); Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 794 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
250. Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789, 794 (E.D. Pa. 1981). See also Com-
ment, The University's Role Toward Student-Athletes: A Moral or Legal Obliga-
tion?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 343 (1991)(arguing that college has no legal duty to prevent
adults with known health conditions from participating in school-sponsored
athletics).
251. The Archdiocese of Cincinnati made a similar argument in defending a high
school athlete's claim that the Act gave him a right to play football with a serious
heart condition despite unanimous physician recommendations against playing.
See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 110 and accompanying text for cases holding there is no constitu-
tionally protected property right or liberty interest to participate in intercollegi-
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injury or dies during competition. 253
All of the foregoing concerns are based on unjustified considera-
tion of the athlete's handicapping condition prohibited by the Act.254
Such concerns contravene a handicapped adult athlete's statutory
right to choose to participate if medical testimony is conflicting re-
garding the medically acceptable risks of playing a given sport. By
offering interscholastic or intercollegiate athletics, schools implicitly
accept the possibility that serious injuries or death may occur even to
able bodied athletes during competition. 255 The Act allows handi-
capped athletes to exercise their individual autonomy and accept rea-
sonable enhanced risks of injury free of the restraints of paternalism.
The Act's prohibition against unjustified exclusion of handicapped
athletes does not infringe a university's First Amendment rights of
religion or association. Congress may condition receipt of Federal
Funds upon compliance with laws that limit the exercise of First
Amendment rights.256 The Act is expressly designed to avoid the use
of federal funds to support unjustified discrimination against handi-
capped persons.
Court-ordered athletics participation under the Act should create
an implied immunity absolving a university of tort liability if an ath-
lete suffers injury during competition resulting from a known physical
handicap or disability.257 Allowing a tort action against the school for
such an injury would inappropriately impose liability for the same
conduct the Act requires (e.g., equal opportunity for athletics partici-
pation by handicapped persons).
Handicapped athletes generally are willing to release a university
from liability as a condition of participation in intercollegiate
sports.25 8 One court has held that a school's fear of tort liability does
ate athletics. Cf. Taylor v. Wake Forest Univ., 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. 1972)(athletics
scholarship is a contract between the university and athlete).
253. See supa note 90 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
256. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 576 (1984). Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.Ct.
1759 (1991)(government refusal to fund program advocating abortion does not vi-
olate First Amendment free speech rights of health care organization).
257. See, e.g., International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196,
1208-09 (1991)(employer tort liability for compliance with Title VII ban against
sex-specific fatal protection policies "remote at best"); Farmers Union v. WDAY,
Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959)(Federal Communications Act of 1934 bars libel action
against broadcaster for defamatory statement by political candidate). Cf. N.Y.
Education Law § a 3208-a(4)(McKinney Supp. 1991) discussed infra notes 271-75
and accompanying text.
258. For example, Anthony Penny released Central Connecticut State University
from liability "as a result of his participation in [basketball] and due soley [sic] to
his cardiovascular systems." See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Mark
Seay agreed to waive any tort claims against Cal State-Long Beach for injury
1023
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not justify excluding a handicapped athlete from participation if the
athlete and his family contractually waive any claims against the
school.259 The court implied, but did not expressly hold, that a fully
informed waiver is valid and enforceable. 260
Assuming no compulsion to participate, voluntary and knowing
waivers and releases of liability by competent adult participants in
sports activities generally are upheld.26 1 If a handicapped adult ath-
lete voluntarily participates in sports knowing his or her condition
creates exposure to increased risk or severity of harm, the assumption
of risk doctrine should bar tort claims against the school arising out of
the handicapping condition.262
iv. Handicapped minor athletes: Some recommendations
High school athletes, most of whom are minors, may not have the
maturity or judgment to weigh rationally the health risks and benefits
of athletics competition with a known handicap or impairment. Minor
athletes generally cannot participate in interscholastic sports without
approval of a parent or guardian. Requiring participation approval of
a competent adult such as a parent or guardian should prevent a hand-
icapped minor from exposure to an unreasonable health risk to play a
particular sport.
Regarding high school athletes, courts are divided regarding
whether paternalism permits schools to deny sports participation
against the desires of a handicapped athlete and his parents. In
Kampmeier v. Nyquist, the court concluded: "[P]ublic school officials
have a parens patriae interest in protecting the well-being of their stu-
dents; defendants, relying on medical opinion, are concerned about the
risk of injury to a child's one good eye." 263
In contrast, the court in Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Educa-
tion observed:
IT]he Board of Education decided that it was part of its function to protect its
resulting from playing football with a missing kidney. See supra note 216 and
accompanying text.
259. Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
260. Id.
261. R. Berry & G. Wong, 2 LAw & Bus. OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRIES 392-404 (1986).
262. See, e.g., Williams v. Cox Enterprises, Inc., 283 S.E.2d 367 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981).
Accord Gehling v. St. George Univ. Sch. of Medicine, Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 419, 427
(E.D.N.Y. 1988)(voluntary entry in race in tropical climate with known heart con-
dition constitutes assumption of risk of collapse during race). But see Comment,
A High Price to Compete: The Feasibility and Effect of Waivers Used to Protect
Schools From Liability For Injuries to Athletes With High Medical Risks, 79 Ky.
L.J. 867 (1991)(suggesting that waivers by physically impaired athletes may be
unenforceable).
263. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 300 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Wolff v. South
Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 534 F. Supp. 758, 761-62 (N.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opin-
ion, 714 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1982).
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students against rational judgments reached by themselves and their parents.
In effect, the Board's decision stands the doctrine of in loco parentis on its
head. Traditionally, this doctrine has meant that a school system must act "in
place of the parents" when the parents are absent. Here, the South Plainfield
Board has acted in a manner contrary to the express wishes of parents, who,
together with their son, have reached a rational decision concerning the risk
involved in wrestling.2 6 4
The Poole decision appears better reasoned because high school of-
ficials should not have the authority to override an informed decision
by a handicapped minor athlete and parents to participate in competi-
tive athletics if competent physicians differ in their participation rec-
ommendations. However, as the Larkin court held, refusing to permit
a handicapped minor athlete to play without medical clearance from a
physician does not violate the Act.265 A high school has a substantial
justification for excluding a handicapped athlete from certain athletics
activities if no physician provides medical clearance for participation.
Tort liability waivers against the school for injury sustained during
athletics participation executed by a minor handicapped athlete and
his parents may not be enforceable. Some states do not permit parents
or guardians to waive a minor's claims to recover for injuries arising
out of participation in interscholastic sports.266 Prior judicial approval
or statutory authorization may be required for waiver of a minor ath-
lete's tort claims against the school to be enforceable. 26 7 The Larkin
court held that a school has a substantial justification for preventing a
handicapped minor athlete from participating if the school is subject
to potential tort liability for doing so. 2 6 8
Refusing to permit a handicapped minor athlete to participate be-
cause of potential tort liability would not be exclusion "solely by rea-
son of handicap." Such a concern can be removed only by judicial
immunity from, or an effective legal waiver of, any claims against a
high school for harm to a handicapped athlete from athletics participa-
tion. In Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District,2 6 9 the court sug-
gested that a high school's concern regarding tort liability is met if a
handicapped minor athlete and parents waive any claims against the
264. Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 952 (D. N.J. 1980)(citation
omitted). See also Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418,423 (E.D.
Pa. 1982). Accord Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 168 (D. Col. 1977)(high
school athletics association rule banning all women from playing soccer on men's
team based on paternalistic concerns invalidated on equal protection grounds).
265. See supm notes 190-99 and accompanying text.
266. Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at 11-12; Childress v. Madison County, 777
S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. App. 1989).
267. Childress v. Madison County, 777 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn. App. 1989).
268. Partial Transcript, supra note 91, at 11-12. But see Poole v. South Plainfield Bd.
of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948, 954 (D. N.J. 1980)(suggesting that minor's legal inca-
pacity to waive claims against school not permissible justification for excluding
handicapped athlete contrary to parents' approval to participate).
269. 550 F. Supp. 418, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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school arising out of athletics participation. It is just and appropriate
to immunize a school from tort liability arising out of court-ordered
athletics participation by handicapped athletes. 270
C. State Education Laws
The analysis in state cases provides an insight into the dilemma
that must be addressed under the Act. At least one state has a statute
limiting a school district's authority to exclude physically impaired
students from their athletics programs.
A New York statute permits a physically impaired student to ob-
tain an injunction prohibiting a school district from excluding him
from its athletics program.271 The athlete must obtain affidavits from
270. See supra note 257 and accompanying text for a discussion of implied tort immu-
nity for a school required to permit a handicapped athlete to participate in athlet-
ics under the Act.
271. N.Y. Education Law § 3208-a (McKinney Supp. 1993). The Act provides:
§ 3208-a. Special proceeding to determine physical capacity of stu-
dent to participate in athletics programs
1. Upon a school district's determination that a student shall not be
permitted to participate in an athletics program by reason of a physical
impairment, based on a medical examination conducted by the school
physician, the student may commence a special proceeding in the
supreme court pursuant to the provision of article four of the civil prac-
tice law and rules to enjoin the school district from prohibiting his par-
ticipation. Such special proceeding may be brought in the county in
which the student resides or in the county in which the school district is
located.
2. The petition in the proceeding shall be a verified petition of a par-
ent or guardian of the student. The petition shall have annexed affida-
vits of at least two licensed physicians setting forth that in their opinion
the student is physically capable of participating in an athletics program,
that participation would be reasonably safe, and any special or preven-
tive measures or devices needed to protect the student.
3. The court shall grant such petition if it is satisfied that it is in the
best interest of the student to participate in an athletics program and
that it is reasonably safe for him to do so.
4. No school district shall be held liable for an injury sustained by a
student granted an order under this section provided such injury is in-
curred during such student's actual participation in an athletics program
and, provided further, that such injury is attributable to the physical im-
pairment for which such court order was obtained.
5. Unless specifically prohibited by the court, an order granted pur-
suant to the provisions of this section shall be considered valid and suffi-
cient for subsequent years, provided that the student has not changed
athletics programs and, further, that two licensed physicians set forth
current affidavits that, in their opinion, the student's physical impair-
ment has not changed since the time of the original court order.
6. In no event shall a successful petitioner be entitled to costs in any
proceeding brought pursuant to this section.
7. The school district shall not be responsible for providing or bear
the cost of, any special or preventive measures or devices needed to pro-
tect the student unless such special or preventive measures or devices
are contained in a student's individual education plan recommended by
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two licensed physicians certifying his physical capability to participate
in an athletics program and that such participation would be reason-
ably safe. 272 The physicians may require the use of special or preven-
tive measures or devices to protect the athlete as a condition of
participation.273
The statute requires a court to order participation if it is in the best
interest of the student and reasonably safe for him to participate in
the school's athletics program.274 The statute immunizes a school dis-
trict from liability for injury sustained by a physically impaired stu-
dent while participating in athletics pursuant to a court order under
the Act.2 75
In Kampmeier v. Harris,276 the New York Appellate Division held
that a high school student with defective vision was entitled to play
contact sports with protective eye wear under the statute's predeces-
sor. The team physician and two other physicians disagreed in their
participation recommendations. 277 The court found plaintiff's partici-
pation would be reasonably safe and in her best interests and ordered
the school district to permit her participation in contact sports.278
Earlier New York cases decided prior to enactment of the statute
upheld a school district's exclusion of physically impaired students
from athletics unless its decision was arbitrary and capricious. 279
These courts held that, even if medical testimony was conflicting, the
school's reliance on its own physician's recommendation that the stu-
dent was medically disqualified from participation was rationally
the school district committee on the handicapped and such student is a
child with a handicapping condition, as defined in section forty-four hun-
dred one of this chapter.
8. A physically impaired child eligible to commence a special pro-
ceeding as provided by this section shall be defined as any child deter-
mined by a school physician as ineligible for participation on the basis of
the regulations of the state education department, the American Medical
Association Guide for Medical Evaluation for Candidates for School
Sports, or by any standard established by the school district involved.
9. An athletics program for the purpose of this section shall include
intramural activities, inter-school activities, extramural activities, and
organized practice as defined by section 135.1 by the commissioner of ed-
ucation's regulations.
Id
272. I § 3208-a(2).
273. I § 3208-a(2).
274. Id- § 3208-a(3).
275. 1& § 3208-a(4).
276. 411 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1978).
277. Id at 745.
278. Id at 746. See also, Swiderski v. Board of Educ. City Sch. Dist. of Albany, 408
N.Y.S.2d 744 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
279. See Columbo v. Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist. No. 2, 383 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct.
1976); Spitaleri v. Nyquist, 345 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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based.280
The New York statute and its application by the Kampmeier court
are consistent with this author's proposed construction of the Rehabil-
itation Act of 1973.281 Both acts require that a school have more than
a mere rational basis (e.g., the team physician's recommendation) for
excluding a handicapped person from athletics participation. The fed-
eral act requires a "substantial justification," 2 2 and the New York
statute requires a showing that it is not "reasonably safe," before a
school may legally justify exclusion from athletics participation.
Under both laws, if competent physicians provide conflicting but cred-
ible participation recommendations, the athlete and his family should
make the participation decision. The sole responsibility of the school
and court is to ensure that the athlete's decision is rational and fully
informed. This standard is satisfied if competent physicians reason-
ably differ regarding the propriety of the athlete's participation in a
particular sport.
VII. PARTICIPATION BY COURT ORDER OR AGREEMENT
In some instances, courts have ordered high schools or colleges to
permit handicapped athletes to participate in interscholastic or inter-
collegiate athletics.28 3 These orders are based on judicial authority
granted by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973284 or state education
statutes.285
In Grube v. Bethlehem Area School District,28 6 the court ordered a
high school to allow the plaintiff to participate in football "on the
same terms and conditions as apply to all other members of the foot-
ball team." In Wright v. Columbia University,28 7 the court enjoined a
university "from denying plaintiff the opportunity of participating in
[its] intercollegiate football program because of his visual handicap."
To settle or avoid threatened litigation, two universities agreed to
permit handicapped athletes to participate in intercollegiate athletics.
Central Connecticut State University agreed to allow Anthony Penny
"to participate in all athletics" at the school with a heart condition.28 8
Long Beach State University agreed to permit Mark Seay to rejoin its
280. Colombo v. Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist. No. 2,383 N.Y.S.2d 518, 522 (Sup. Ct.
1976); Spitaleri v. Nyquist, 345 N.Y.S.2d 878, 879 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
281. See supra notes 220-27 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418,425 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
Wright v. Columbia Univ., 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kampmeier v. Harris,
411 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1978).
284. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794a(a)(1)(West 1985).
285. N.Y. Education Law § 3208-a(3)(McKinney Supp. 1993).
286. 550 F. Supp. 418, 425 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
287. 520 F. Supp. 789, 795 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
288. See Release, supra note 68, at 2.
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football team after having a kidney surgically removed.2 8 9
Most of the handicapped athletes asserting a legal right to partici-
pate in a sport have exceptional or above average athletics skills. 290
By virtue of their superior athletics ability, they expect to play in
games if permitted to be on the team. They usually desire to play be-
cause of their love of the game or pursuit of an athletics scholarship or
professional sports career.291
Whether an agreement or court order permitting an athlete to
"participate" requires a coach to actually play the athlete in games
raises a difficult unresolved issue. Schools generally vest head coaches
with the sole discretion to govern their teams and decide which ath-
letes play.292
A coach may face an agonizing decision regarding whether to play
a handicapped athlete who is the most skilled player at his position. A
college coach's livelihood depends upon fielding winning teams, 293 and
there is a strong incentive to play the team's best athletes. For exam-
ple, Tony Penny played in basketball games at Central Connecticut
State University during his senior year with a known heart condi-
tion.294 Mark Tingstad was allowed to play in football games at Ari-
zona State University with spinal stenosis.295
A coach may be understandably reluctant to play an athlete whose
handicap places him at an increased risk of injury. Tony Penny subse-
quently died of a heart attack while playing professional basketball in
England.296 Mark Tingstad was temporarily paralyzed while making a
tackle during a football game.297
It is arguable that a coach's refusal to play an exceptionally tal-
ented handicapped athlete solely because of concern for the athlete's
health violates court ordered participation under the Act. In Grube v.
Bethlehem Area School District, the court ordered that a handicapped
athlete be permitted to participate "on the same terms and conditions
289. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 190, 212-19 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
292. See Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 679 F. Supp. 833, 853 (N.D.
Ill. 1988)(high school officials have "broad discretion" in administering sports
programs). In re Clayton, University of Wyoming's Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law (Dec. 22,1988) at 5. Cy. Sorey v. Kellett, 849 F.2d 960 (5th
Cir. 1988) (head football coach is public official charged with general discretionary
authority over football program and protected by sovereign immunity). See gen-
erally Comment, The Authority of a College Coach. A Legal Analysis, 49 OR. L.
REv. 442 (1970).
293. Gary R. Roberts, Financial Incentives Wrong For College Athletics, THE NCAA
NEWS, Nov. 4, 1991, at 4.
294. See Altman, supra note 62.
295. See Demak, supra note 86.
296. See Altman, supra note 62.
297. See Demak, supra note 86.
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as apply to all other members" of the team.298 If athletics ability is the
sole determining factor of playing time, a coaching decision to play a
lesser skilled, physically unimpaired athlete rather than a more tal-
ented handicapped athlete may violate the court's order.
A better approach is to avoid judicial scrutiny of a coach's discre-
tionary decisions regarding who plays in games and how much playing
time is received. A player's leadership qualities and attitude as well as
numerous other intangibles may influence a coach's decision on play-
ing time as much as or more than an athlete's raw physical skills. A
coach may decide the team's needs are not best served by playing a
handicapped athlete. Coaches, not courts, are in the best position to
make this subtle determination. 299
VIII. CONCLUSION
Motivated by a passion for sports, dreams of stardom or economic
factors, some handicapped high school and college athletes desire to
participate in competitive sports even if their condition creates an en-
hanced risk or severity of injury. Team physicians, often after consul-
tation with specialists, refuse to provide medical clearance to play if
they deem the risks of athletics participation with a handicap or physi-
cal abnormality to create medically unacceptable risks. Other physi-
cians, including specialists, may disagree with the team physician's
evaluation of the nature and severity of medical risks of athletics par-
ticipation and clear the athlete to play based on a belief that such risks
are reasonable under the circumstances. Expressing concern for their
students' health and well being and fearing potential tort liability and
adverse publicity if serious harm results, schools generally accept the
team physician's recommendation not to allow a handicapped athlete
to participate in a given sport.
Ideally, the participation decision should be the product of mutual
agreement between the team physician and consulting specialists,
school officials and the athlete and family. Disagreements regarding
the propriety of participation in a particular sport with a specific hand-
298. Grube v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 550 F. Supp. 418, 425 (E.D.Pa. 1982).
299. Courts generally hold that there is no constitutionally protected property or lib-
erty interest in playing intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics. See supra note
110 and accompanying text. An athletics scholarship creates a property interest
only in the athlete's receipt of agreed upon funds-not playing, which is merely a
"unilateral expectation." Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940,
944-45 (D. Kan. 1987). Many colleges will honor a previously granted athletics
scholarship if an athlete discontinues playing after a handicapping condition or
physical abnormality is discovered. Altman, supra note 62. The University of
Wyoming continued to honor Steve Clayton's athletics scholarship although it
refused to permit him to continue playing football with spinal stenosis. Tele-
phone Interview with Dan Viola, University of Wyoming Assistant Athletics Di-
rector (Jul. 24, 1991).
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icap or disability must be resolved on an individual basis under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 or applicable federal or state statutes
prohibiting discrimination against handicapped or physically impaired
athletes.
The Act prohibits the categorical exclusion of athletes with the
physical ability and skills of playing a particular sport despite a handi-
cap with or without reasonable accommodation. A school must have a
substantial justification to exclude a handicapped athlete from partici-
pation. Physical inability to perform, increased risk of injury to other
participants, the need for fundamental or substantial alterations to en-
able a handicapped athlete to participate, or undisputed medical rec-
ommendations against playing should justify exclusion of a
handicapped athlete from certain sports under the Act.
The Act limits a school's ability to exclude a handicapped athlete
from athletics participation based solely on a concern for the student's
own health and safety and prohibits substituting the school's judg-
ment for a rational and fully informed decision by a handicapped ath-
lete. A school's duty is to ensure that the athlete is fully informed of
all medical risks of participation with a known handicap and that
there is credible medical testimony recommending participation in the
subject sport.
The Act does not provide a handicapped athlete with an unquali-
fied right to participate in athletics at institutions receiving federal
funding. A handicapped athlete's decision to play school-sponsored
sports must be based on medically sound participation approval by a
competent physician. A school has a substantial justification for ex-
cluding a handicapped athlete if no physician medically clears him or
her to play. Physician adherence to their paramount duty to protect
an athlete's health and to disapprove participation if health risks are
medically unacceptable should ensure that an athlete's decision to par-
ticipate in sports is rational. If competent physicians differ regarding
the nature and severity of the medical risks and advisability of athlet-
ics participation based on their examination of the athlete and clinical
judgment and experience, the Act empowers the athlete and parents
(if the athlete is a minor) to make the participation decision.
A handicapped athlete choosing to participate in athletics after full
disclosure of all medically significant risks should be deemed to as-
sume the risk of injury or death arising out of playing with a known
handicap. A handicapped athlete should consider carefully whether
the potential benefits of athletics participation outweighs the risks of
permanent crippling injury or death such as happened to Hank Gath-
ers, Tony Penny, and others.
Schools should be absolved of legal liability for permitting partici-
pation by handicapped athletes supported by a credible medical opin-
ion approving participation in a given sport and based on court orders
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or contractual releases. Courts should not interfere with the discre-
tionary decision of coaches regarding which athletes actually play dur-
ing games. The Act establishes an amateur handicapped athlete's
right to participate on equal terms with non-handicapped athletes, not
an absolute right to a quantity of playing time or to pursue a specula-
tive college athletics scholarship or professional career.
Construing the Act and similar state laws in the proposed manner
will balance appropriately a handicapped athlete's right to participate
in athletics activities within his or her physical abilities, physician
evaluation of the medical risks of athletics participation, and a school's
interests in conducting a safe athletics program.
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